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Abstract: Calabresi and Melamed published the seminal article on property rules and 
liability rules in 1972.  In recent years new articles presenting rigorous analyses of 
bargaining incentives have overturned some of the fundamental claims of the Calabresi-
Melamed analysis.  In particular, the proposition that property rules are socially 
preferable to liability rules when transaction costs are low appears to be either no longer 
valid or severely weakened under the new analyses.  This paper reexamines the property 
rule versus liability rule question in light of the contributions of the recent bargaining 
theory literature.  In contrast to this literature, I find that the fundamental propositions of  
Calabresi-Melamed remain valid, and I extend the framework to provide a more detailed 
positive economic theory of common law rules.  The key contribution of this paper is 
pointing out the importance of subjective valuations in the analysis of property and 
liability rules.  This allows for a synthesis of Calabresi-Melamed and the bargaining 
theory literature within an expanded framework. 
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I. Introduction 
 The law reflects two general policies in its effort to regulate conduct.  One is a 
policy of prohibition, of simply not tolerating certain acts or types of conduct to any 
degree.  The other is a policy of “pricing” or “internalization”, which requires law 
violators to pay for the injuries to their victims, but does not attempt to completely 
suppress or deter the conduct that gave rise to the victims’ injuries.1  A theory that 
explains why one policy should be preferred to the other can go a substantial way toward 
explaining many of the rules of tort, property, and criminal law. 
 Legal scholars typically refer to this choice between policies as a choice between 
property rules and liability rules.2  Property rules, as the name suggests, secure 
entitlements as property.  To secure something as property, the rules must effectively 
prohibit others from taking or damaging the entitlement without first gaining the consent 
of the owner.  Liability rules, on the other hand, do not seek to provide the security of a 
property rule.  Liability rules do not seek to force those who would take or damage an 
entitlement from first gaining consent, or to take actions that would harm the entitlement 
only under conditions in which consent would likely have been given.3  Liability rules 
                                                 
1 The distinction between these two general policies has been noted in many articles.  Perhaps the best 
known effort to generalize and build a theory based on this distinction is Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 
1089 (1972).  The distinction has also been described as one between “prices” and “sanctions”, see Robert 
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1523 (1984).  The distinction between a policy of 
prohibition versus one of internalization was also central to Becker’s seminal article on the economics of 
criminal law, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment; An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 
(1968). 
2 This is based on the language of Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1. 
3 One might argue that the negligence standard, a type of liability rule, sets up incentives that approximate 
those under a regime of consensual transactions.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 
J. Legal Studies 29, 37 (1972) (describing negligence rule as approximating the safety precautions that 
would have been agreed upon if the parties had negotiated).  Under the negligence rule, the injurer faces no 
liability, and therefore makes no effort to take care, whenever the cost of care exceeds the expected harm to 
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seek simply to require the party taking or damaging the entitlement to pay a damage 
assessment determined by a court.  One can think of the difference between the rules in 
terms of the expectations of actors.  Property rules seek, as Bentham once put it, to secure 
and to settle expectations with respect to an entitlement.4  Liability rules, in contrast, aim 
merely to reallocate the burden of a loss after it has occurred. 
 This paper presents a simple economic analysis of property rules and liability 
rules.  My aim is to try to bring clarity to an area of legal theory that has become rather 
confused lately.  Calabresi and Melamed published the seminal article on property rules 
and liability rules in 1972,5 and for many years the results of that analysis had gone 
unquestioned.6  Moreover, the Calabresi-Melamed analysis has formed the basis for more 
than one rich positive theory of the common law.7  In recent years, however, new articles 
presenting rigorous analyses of bargaining incentives have overturned some of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the victim.  One could argue that in this case, the injurer would have purchased the consent of the victim 
under a regime of consensual transactions. But the negligence rule approximates market conditions in only 
a rough sense.  The damage awards under negligence law are at best a rough approximation and probably 
far below the amount that would be demanded by most victims in order to permit the injurer to inflict a 
substantial physical injury.  See, e.g., Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1125 (“Liability rules 
represent only an approximation of the value of the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such 
an approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the thief than to the owner”). 
4 Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, 68-69 (Oceana Pub. Inc. 1975); Jeremy Bentham, Security and 
Equality of Property, 51, reprinted in Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (C.B. Macpherson, ed.), 
39-58 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1978). 
5 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1. 
6 For an intellectual history of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis, see James E. Krier and Stewart Schwab, 
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 440-456 
(1995).  Krier and Schwab cite A. Mitchell Polinsky’s discussion of nuisance law as the first published 
piece to question the conclusions of the Calabresi-Melamed article.  See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving 
Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075 
(1980). 
7 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal 
Stud. 13 (1985); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum L. Rev. 1193 
(1985); Michael Wachter and George Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An 
Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U  
Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 1364-1376 (1988). 
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fundamental claims of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis.8  The most comprehensive of 
these articles is one by Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow.9  In particular, one key part of 
the Calabresi-Melamed analysis, the proposition that property rules are socially 
preferable to liability rules when transaction costs are low, appears to be either no longer 
valid or severely weakened under the new analyses.10  This has important implications for 
much of the positive legal theory developed on the basis of this proposition.11 
 This paper reexamines the property rule versus liability rule question in light of 
the contributions of the recent bargaining theory literature.  In contrast to this literature, I 
find that the fundamental propositions of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis remain valid 
for the most part,12 and I extend the framework to provide a more detailed positive 
                                                 
8 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. 
L. Rev. 713 (1996); Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L. J. 1027 (1995). For articles building on the contributions of these 
two, see Ian Ayres and Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability 
Rules, 100 Michigan L. Rev. 1 (2001); Ian Ayres and Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of 
Property and Liability Rules,23 J. Legal Stud. 121 (2003); Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 
International Rev. Law and Econ 269-97 (2004).  For an article anticipating (though without formal 
analysis) some of the arguments of the Shavell and Kaplow and Ayres and Talley pieces, see James E. 
Krier and Stewart Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 440 (1995). 
9 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8. 
10 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 718 (“In addition, we will cast doubt on the belief that property 
rules are best when transaction costs are low – assertedly because the use of property rules will induce 
parties to bargain and reach desirable outcomes – whereas liability rules are best when transaction costs are 
high – supposedly because the use of liability rules will induce injurers to act desirably, mimicking the 
outcomes that would otherwise have been reached through bargaining.”). 
11 For example, Posner’s positive economic theory of criminal law, supra note 7, appears to be based on the 
Calabresi-Melamed analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 111 - 112.  If the Calabresi-Melamed 
analysis is wrong, then Posner’s theory falls with it.  This is distinguishable from the case in which a theory 
is challenged for having “unrealistic” assumptions.  For discussion of the importance of assumptions, see 
Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics ch.1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) 
(presenting the case for positive economic analysis and defending economic analysis against the critique 
that its assumptions are unrealistic).  The bargaining theory literature implies that the Calabresi-Melamed 
analysis is logically flawed – like a theory that depends on the assumption that one plus one is equal to 
three.  If the critique of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis contained in the bargaining theory literature is 
correct, then that analysis and others that build on it must be invalid. 
12 Richard Epstein’s most recent contribution to the property versus liability rules literature is in some 
respects similar to this paper and in others quite different, see Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the 
Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 Yale L. J. 2091 (1997).  Like this paper, Epstein’s paper 
reexamines the property versus liability rules question in light of relatively recent contributions to the 
literature.  Unlike this paper, Epstein argues, contrary to Calabresi and Melamed, that property rules are 
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economic theory of common law rules.  The key contribution of this paper is pointing out 
the importance of “subjective valuations” in the analysis of property and liability rules.  
Property rules, unlike liability rules, protect the subjective valuations of entitlement 
holders.13  I show that Calabresi and Melamed’s conclusions with respect to property 
rules depend heavily on this protective function.  In particular, if subjective valuations are 
not protected, as is the case under the liability rule, society will incur greater rule 
enforcement and denormalization costs than would be incurred under the property rule.  I 
use the term denormalization to refer to the whole array of costs (reduced investment 
incentives, enhanced taking incentives, reciprocal takings, protective investments, 
shortened planning horizons) incurred when norms respecting property break down.14 
                                                                                                                                                 
generally preferable to liability rules, except in the cases of hold out and bilateral monopoly.  A different 
approach to this issue is reflected in Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. Law Review 
1719 (2004).  Smith also reexamines the debate in light of the contributions of the bargaining theory 
literature.  Smith argues that property rules are preferable generally because information about the value of 
property is costly to produce, and property rules allow those who incur those costs to reap and hold on to 
the rewards.  Smith’s argument is a largely, though not entirely, Hayekian defense of property rules.  
Another article that discusses the recent contributions and goes on to suggest that property rules should be 
preferred to liability rules is Carol Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 107 Yale L. J. 2175 (1997). 
13 The protective function (i.e., protecting subjective valuations) of property rules is noted in the Calabresi 
and Melamed article, supra note 1, at 1092, 1105.  However, because the Calabresi-Melamed discussion is 
informal, the importance of this protective function in their analysis may seem unclear to many readers. 
One recent discussion of property and liability rules that points to the importance of the protective function 
of property rules where subjective valuations are heterogeneous is Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis 
of Law 68-70 (6th ed. 2003).  Posner, responding to the implications of the bargaining theory literature, 
argues that if damages awards are equal to average harm, those who expect their harm to be greater than 
average will take precautionary measures to avoid the taking, and those who expect their harm to be less 
than average will take no precautions.  The result would be “excessive efforts at taking and preventing the 
taking of property.”  Id. at 69.  For an analysis of precautionary and other investment incentives under 
property and liability rules, in the context of harmful externalities, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Property Rights 
and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 601 (2001). 
14 Denormalization includes the “demoralization” costs (Frank Michelman’s term) that occur because when 
property is expropriated, victims are demoralized, weakening their incentives to invest in property in the 
future.  See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214-1215 (1967).  More specifically, Michelman 
defined demoralization costs as “the total of . . . the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which 
accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is offered, 
and . . . the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives 
or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other 
observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some 
other occasion.”  Id. at 1214.  Since Michelman’s definition does not seem to include some other costs that 
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 I extend the analysis of property and liability rules to generate a more detailed 
statement of the choice between the two rules (or rule types).  The basic propositions 
originally set out in Calabresi and Melamed can be framed, and stated more expansively, 
in terms of the assumptions regarding transaction costs and the subjective valuations of 
takers (or injurers) and victims. 
 The model presented in this paper allows for a synthesis of the results from 
Calabresi and Melamed and from the bargaining theory literature within an expanded 
framework.  The bargaining theory literature has expanded the analysis of property and 
liability rules by focusing on a special case in which bargaining is feasible but the 
likelihood of  bargaining failure is substantial.  The reason emphasized in the bargaining 
theory literature for the substantial likelihood of bargaining failure is informational 
asymmetry – in particular, each party to a bargain knows his own subjective valuation but 
only (at best) the distribution of subjective valuations for other bargaining parties.15  The 
case in which bargaining is feasible although the probability of failure is substantial is an 
important special case that does not fit easily within the high-versus-low transaction cost 
framework introduced in Calabresi and Melamed.16  The special case is so important that 
an expanded framework should take into account three scenarios: high transaction costs, 
where parties are unlikely to reach an agreement or to even bargain (perhaps because the 
cost of meeting to negotiate is prohibitive); low transaction costs, where parties always 
                                                                                                                                                 
are likely to follow from expropriation (e.g., protective expenditures, investment in technology that 
facilitates taking), I have opted for an alternative term. 
15 Ayres and Talley, supra note 8, at 1035 and n.30; Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 720, 734-738. 
16 Confusion over which category (high versus low transaction costs) is appropriate for the informational 
asymmetry case is observable in the literature.  Kaplow and Shavell examine the asymmetric case as part of 
their analysis of bargaining under low transaction costs, see Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 720.   
However, Calabresi and Melamed suggested that the asymmetric information case belongs in the high 
transaction cost category, see infra text accompanying notes 86-87; Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, 
at 1119.  This simple difference in labeling is one of the reasons the conclusions of  Kaplow and Shavell 
diverge from those of Calabresi and Melamed. 
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bargain to an agreement; and intermediate transaction costs, where the cost of meeting to 
bargain is low but the likelihood of failure to reach agreement is substantial (because of 
strategic behavior).17 
 The new proposition regarding property rules and liability rules should be set out 
for the three cases of high, low, and intermediate transaction costs.  The simplest version 
covers the polar cases of high and low transaction costs, and in these extreme cases the 
basic propositions of Calabresi and Melamed remain largely intact (with minor 
extensions to reflect the importance of subjective valuations).  For the high and low 
transaction cost settings, the new proposition consists of the three parts and can be stated 
as follows.  (1) When transaction costs are high, and some takers have subjective 
valuations that exceed those of victims, the liability rule is preferable to the property rule 
protecting the victim.  (2) When transaction costs are high and the subjective valuations 
of victims exceed those of all takers, then the property rule protecting the victim is 
equivalent to the liability rule.  (3) When transaction costs are low, the property rule is 
preferable to the liability rule – irrespective of the distribution of subjective valuations.   
 For the intermediate transaction costs case – i.e., the case in which the cost of 
meeting to bargain is low but the likelihood of bargaining failure substantial – the choice 
between the property rule and the liability rule depends on a balancing of the costs from 
failing to protect subjective valuations and the costs of bargaining failure.  If the costs of 
                                                 
17 This suggests that transaction cost settings can be analyzed in terms of the costs of coordination and the 
costs of assent.  The standard low transaction cost setting is one of low coordination and assent costs.  For 
example, if the parties can meet to bargain easily (low coordination costs) and both are perfectly informed, 
one would say that transaction costs are low.  The standard high transaction cost assumption is usually one 
of high coordination costs.  For example, in the traffic accident setting, coordination costs prevent parties 
from meeting to bargain before an accident occurs.  When coordination costs are high, it does not matter 
whether assent costs are low or high because the parties will be unable to bargain.  The intermediate 
transaction cost case I define in the text is one of low coordination costs and high assent costs.  The term 
intermediate should not be understood to imply that the costs of bargaining failure are low in comparison to 
the high transaction cost case. 
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bargaining failure are low relative to those that result from failing to protect subjective 
valuations, the property rule protecting the victim is socially preferable.18  On the other 
hand, if the costs of bargaining failure are relatively high – say, because almost all 
bargains would fail – , the liability rule is preferable to the property rule.  Although the 
balancing test is an empirical question, society has already provided answers to it in 
many parts of the law.19  For example, eminent domain substitutes a liability rule for 
what would ordinarily be a property rule, precisely because the costs and frequency of 
bargaining failure are likely to be high relative to the costs of failing to protect subjective 
valuations.20  For essentially the same reason, nuisance law substitutes a liability rule in a 
setting in which a property rule would be a feasible alternative, given the ease with which 
adjacent land possessors can meet to bargain.21  And in the labor law context, we see the 
opposite approach: even though the likelihood of bargaining failure is substantial,22 the 
law has remained with a property rule, though modified in order to reduce the likelihood 
                                                 
18 Bargaining failure – that is, the failure of bargaining to lead to an agreement – is costly because it results 
in forgone opportunities for both parties to the bargain to enhance their welfare.  For example, if an 
agreement between A and B would have improve the welfare of A by $20 and the welfare of B by $20, the 
cost of bargaining failure is the forgone gain of $40.  Failing to protect subjective valuations is costly for 
reasons given earlier: (1) expropriated victims sue, generating administrative costs, and (2) both 
expropriated and potential victims are “demoralized” to the extent that they can no longer feel secure in 
their holdings and potential takers are emboldened (denormalization costs).  Suppose the sum of 
administrative (litigation) and denormalization costs, discounted to present value, is $100.  Since, under 
these assumptions, the cost of failing to protect subjective valuations, $100, is greater than the cost of 
bargaining failure, $40, the property rule is preferable to the liability rule. 
19 This point is also made in Epstein, supra note 12, at 2095. 
20 Although Calabresi and Melamed do not state this proposition, their discussion of eminent domain 
suggests that this is the likely explanation for the emininent domain rule, see Calabresi and Melamed, supra 
note 1, 1106-1108. 
21 Thomas Merrill introduced the distinction between transaction costs and “entitlement-determination” 
costs in order to explain the rules that have developed under the nuisance law, see Merrill, supra note 7, at 
19-26.  Under this approach, many nuisance settings involve low coordination costs, since the parties are 
often adjacent landowners.  However, the same disputes typically involve high entitlement-determination 
costs, since the definition of the entitlement in dispute is often unclear. 
22 This is because of the informational asymmetry problem.  Wachter and Cohen, supra note 7; Keith N. 
Hylton, An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain, 83 Geo. L. J. 19 (1994). 
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of bargaining failure.23  As these examples suggest, the expanded property-versus-
liability-rule propositions set out in this paper help us understand some fundamental 
features of the common law. 
 Indeed, one goal of this paper is to use the property versus liability rule 
distinction to generate a more detailed positive theory of the law than has been offered 
previously in the literature on property and liability rules.  In this sense, I am returning to 
the initial direction taken by Calabresi and Melamed, who laid the groundwork for 
theories that take the distinction between property and liability rules as a foundation from 
which to gain a deeper understanding of the common law.24  The more detailed 
propositions regarding property rules and liability rules offered here generate 
explanations for the treatment of reckless and negligent conduct in tort law, as well as 
that of reckless and intentional endangerment in criminal law.  The theory also explains 
the conditions under which damages should be awarded for pain and suffering, and under 
which compensatory and punitive damages should be assessed.  The final application 
uses property rule theory to justify the bargaining doctrine in labor law.    
 Part II of this paper reviews the literature on property rules and liability rules, 
focusing on the initial contribution of Calabresi and Melamed and the recent 
contributions of the bargaining theory literature.25  Part III presents a simple model of 
                                                 
23 I am referring to the duty to bargain doctrine of labor law.  Wachter and Cohen, supra note 7; Hylton, 
Duty to Bargain, supra. 
24 Calabresi and Melamed did use their theory to explain important features of the common law, though 
they provided only an outline or sketch.  See Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1106-1110 (general 
theory of property and liability rules) and 1124-1127 (sketching application of theory to criminal law and 
nuisance law). The latter half of this paper uses the more detailed property-versus-liability rule propositions 
of this paper to provide a broader and more detailed justification for common law rules. 
25 I focus on the bargaining theory literature because this literature suggests that the Calabresi-Melamed 
conclusions are invalid, largely within the terms of their original model.  Polinsky’s analysis, as Krier and 
Schwab note, supra note 6, at 453-455, shows that when damage assessment costs are taken into account 
the Calabresi-Melamed conclusions become unreliable.  Krier and Schwab argue that damage assessment 
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bargaining over entitlements, assuming the absence of informational or other incentive 
impediments to reaching agreement.  I examine the welfare implications of property and 
liability rules in Part III.  In Part IV, I compare property and liability rules when there are 
informational or other incentive impediments to reaching agreement.  Part V briefly 
covers the case of harmful externalities.  Part VI discusses implications for law.  In this 
part I use the extended property-versus-liability-rule propositions to justify some basic 
features of tort, criminal, and property law, as well as the modified or conditional 
property rule created by labor law. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
 The literature in this area obviously begins with Calabresi and Melamed’s article.  
The short “sound-byte” version of the fundamental proposition of Calabresi and 
Melamed is that property rules are preferable to liability rules when bargaining (or 
transaction) costs are low.  To be more precise, the proposition should be stated as 
follows: when transaction costs are low, a property rule protecting the victim is preferable 
to a liability rule in which the injurer pays the victim’s damages. 
 The argument for this proposition is that when transaction costs are low, an 
individual who is interested in acquiring the property of another individual should 
bargain for the property in order to reach a price that both parties find agreeable.26  
                                                                                                                                                 
costs are likely to be higher than transaction costs, which suggests a social preference for property rules, 
id., 453-465.  This is also suggested by the argument of Smith, supra note 12.  While this is a very 
important point, it introduces a feature that is not part of the original Calabresi-Melamed model. 
26 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1105 (suggesting property rules protect subjective valuations) 
and 1106 (suggesting property rules lead to economically efficient transfers).  See also, Richard A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law 69 (6th ed. 2003). 
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Property rules encourage bargaining by prohibiting the taking of property.27  However, 
when transaction costs are high bargaining is infeasible.  The only role left for the law is 
to reallocate the risk of loss of the entitlement between the two parties.   
 Liability rules appear in this argument to be second-best options that are chosen 
by the law, in the high transaction cost setting, because property rules would be 
ineffective.  Property rules would be ineffective in the high transaction cost setting 
because bargaining would not occur, and because the rules would work to obstruct a great 
deal of legitimate activity.28  If a car driver were required by the law to negotiate with 
every pedestrian at risk of being hit by his car to gain permission to impose that risk, cars 
would be largely useless. 
 A new literature focusing on bargaining incentives has questioned some of the 
key parts of the Calabresi-Melamed theory.  The new articles have substantially advanced 
the theory of property and liability rules by introducing a careful analysis of bargaining 
incentives.29  Since the Kaplow and Shavell paper presents the most general analysis, I 
will focus on their treatment. 
 Kaplow and Shavell examine bargaining under property and liability rules in the 
high transaction cost and low transaction cost settings.  In the high transaction cost 
setting, they conclude that the liability rule (with damages equal to average harm) is 
preferable to either a property rule protecting the victim or a property rule protecting the 
                                                 
27 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092. 
28 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1109. 
29In particular, papers written by Ian Ayres and Eric Talley and by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have 
modified the theory of property and liability rules.  For another article that incorporates a more detailed 
analysis of bargaining incentives, see Krier and Schwab, supra note 6.  While Krier and Schwab do not 
challenge the basic propositions from Calabresi and Melamed, their analysis anticipates some of the issues 
examined more rigorously in the Kaplow and Shavell article. 
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injurer.30  Although this conclusion agrees with that of Calabresi and Melamed, they 
provide a stronger case for the liability rule.  While the liability rules appears as a second-
best option in the Calabresi-Melamed analysis, Kaplow and Shavell argue that the 
liability rule is preferable because it exploits the private information held by injurers.31  
An injurer who knows that his cost of forbearance or precaution is greater than the 
victim’s harm will not forbear under the liability rule, while an injurer who knows that 
his cost of forbearance is less than the victim’s harm will forbear under the liability rule.  
These are the efficient outcomes.32  Moreover, property rules are incapable of exploiting 
the private information of injurers in this fashion, and would therefore lead to inefficient 
outcomes in the high transaction cost setting.  
 In the low transaction cost setting, Kaplow and Shavell first analyze the case of 
perfect information,33  a setting in which both parties to a bargain know what the other 
needs in order to reach an agreement;34 and given this knowledge, bargaining is always 
successful.  In the perfect information case, Kaplow and Shavell show that property and 
                                                 
30 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 727. 
31 Id. at 725. 
32 Of course, this assumes that the damages remedy accurately compensates for harm suffered.  If the 
damage award always falls substantially below (or above)  
the harm suffered, then the liability rule will not lead to the efficient outcome. 
33 Kaplow and Shavell use different terms, describing the case more generally as one in which bargaining is 
always successful, Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 733. 
34 The perfect information assumption guarantees (or generally should guarantee) that bargains will be 
successful, because both parties know precisely the point that must be reached in order to reach an 
agreement.  This is stronger than the assumption of complete information with respect to reservation prices.  
Suppose, for example, A and B are bargaining over a coffee mug.  Suppose A owns the coffee mug, and B 
is attempting to purchase it.  In the complete information case, A knows the maximum that B is willing to 
pay for the mug, and B knows the minimum that A must get in order to sell the mug.  Moreover, each party 
knows that the other knows its reservation price.  In other words, A’s “asking price” is common knowledge 
and B’s “offer price” is also common knowledge.  See Robert Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, Annals of 
Statistics 4, 1236-9, 1976; John Geanakoplos, Common Knowledge, Journal of Economic Perspectives 
6:53-82, 1992.  However, even if the parties share complete information with respect to reservation prices, 
they may still fail to reach agreement because they cannot agree on a division of the surplus.  The perfect 
information assumption implies that the parties know not only their respective reservation prices, but also 
the precise division of surplus that satisfies both sides of the agreement.  
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liability rules are equivalent in terms of bargaining outcomes.35  This contradicts the 
Calabresi-Melamed article.  In the imperfect information case (i.e., the case in which the 
parties do not know what the other needs in order to reach an agreement), Kaplow and 
Shavell conclude that property rules and liability rules cannot be ranked on efficiency (or 
welfare) grounds.  Neither rule leads to the efficient outcome, and the relative efficiency 
of the two rules cannot be determined a priori.36  Again, this is a result that contradicts 
Calabresi and Melamed. 
 In the end, Kaplow and Shavell conclude that property rules are probably 
preferable to liability rules in the low transaction cost setting, but not because of the 
bargaining arguments originally advanced in Calabresi and Melamed.  They point to the 
problem of “reciprocal takings” (if you steal my car, I will retaliate by stealing your car) 
and bad incentive effects of a rule permitting takings.37 
 I have no quibbles with the basic analysis of the new bargaining theory literature.  
However, I will show below that the failure of this literature to focus on the protection of 
subjective valuations causes its conclusions to be incomplete, and its implicit critique of 
Calabresi and Melamed to be invalid.  I will focus largely on the perfect information case 
(bargaining is always successful), since this is the core of the controversy. 
 
                                                 
35 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 733.  As Kaplow and Shavell note, id., at 732, the conclusion that 
property and liability rules are equivalent in the no transaction cost setting is an implication of the Coase 
theorem.  According to the Coase theorem, the efficient allocation will always result from bargaining when 
transaction costs are low.  R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).  Without 
reaching the conclusion of Kaplow and Shavell, the discussion in Krier and Schwab shows an awareness of 
the difficulties the Coase theorem poses for the basic propositions of Calabresi and Melamed, see Krier and 
Schwab, supra note 6, at 450 n.37. 
36 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 779-787. For an informal explanation of their conclusion, see infra 
text accompanying notes 80 - 85. 
37 Id. at 722.  See also Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and the Benefits from Crime, 12 Int’l 
Rev. L. & Econ. 225 (1993). 
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III. Transactions and Perfect Information 
 
 In this Part, I will use a model presented through a numerical example to analyze 
welfare outcomes under property and liability rules.  I will focus on the case in which all 
parties are informed of the valuations other parties put on any given property. 
 
A. Market Not Available: High Transaction Costs 
 
   I will refer to the holder of property as the “victim”, and the potential taker of 
property as “taker”.  Suppose each victim owns a bicycle worth $75 on the market – i.e., 
objectively valued.38  However, the victim’s subjective valuation may differ from the 
market value.39  For example, the victim may have fond memories associated with his 
bicycle – learning how to ride or to do new tricks on it, winning races – and for this 
reason will demand more than $75 in a trade.  On the other hand, the victim may have 
negative thoughts associated with the bicycle – terrible falls, flat tires – and might be 
willing to sell it for less than its market value of $75. 
 Victims come in two types: “high-valuing” victims and “low-valuing” victims.  
High-valuing victims place a subjective valuation of $85 on the bicycle.  This means that 
even though the bicycle has an objective market value of $75, they will not voluntarily 
                                                 
38 The objective value of an item might be determined by the market equilibrium price – that is, the price at 
which the quantity supplied on the market equals the quantity demanded.  For items that have unique 
features, such as a house, the objective value might be determined by an auction, or by comparing 
comparable items. 
39 The victim’s subjective valuation of an item can be viewed as his maximum bid for that item.  For 
example, a widget might have a market value of $10, yet some consumer might be willing to pay 
considerably more than $10 for the widget.  The subjective valuation may reflect more than the mere 
hedonistic preferences or special feelings for the item.  For example, a person may be willing to bid more 
than the market price for a bicycle because he knows something about the value of the bicycle that others 
do not, or because he needs the bicycle for an important work assignment. 
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sell their bicycles for less than $85.  Low-valuing victims place a subjective valuation of 
$65 on their bicycles.  I will assume, in addition, that the population of victims is split 
evenly between high- and low-valuing types.  It follows that the average of the victims’ 
subjective valuations is equal to the objective market value of $75.40 
 If a victim were to appear in court seeking damages for a stolen bicycle, the court 
would award the victim the objective value.  This is a reasonable assumption.  Courts 
cannot determine subjective valuations; the expense of the effort would be prohibitive.  
But they can easily get their hands on objective market value data for many items.  Thus, 
under a liability rule, victims would be awarded $75. 
 Now consider the population of takers.  As the name suggests, takers attempt to 
acquire bicycles from victims.  Like victims, takers come in two types.  One type, high-
valuing takers, places a subjective valuation on a bicycle of $100.  The other, low-valuing 
takers, places a subjective valuation of $25.  Half of the takers are of one type, and half of 
the other type.41 
 Assume transaction costs are high, so that there is no opportunity for takers to 
bargain with victims before deciding whether they should take a bicycle.  Is a property 
rule preferable to a liability rule? 
 
B. Property Rule and Liability Rule Compared, High Transaction Cost Setting 
 
                                                 
40 Even though the damage award is never equal to the precise subjectively-measured loss suffered by a 
victim, it is the correct level on average.  Thus, the discussion of correct-on-average damage awards by 
Kaplow and Shavell applies to this example.  Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 726-727 (showing that 
correct-on-average damage awards are superior in the high transaction cost case to property rules). 
41 To simplify the analysis, I assume takers go after bicycles only for use.  Otherwise, low valuing takers 
would take bicycles and try to sell them for the objective market value, or pay a low price and try to sell it 
for $75 – e.g., pay $68 sell for $75.  The key conclusions of the analysis in this paper do not depend on this 
simplifying assumption. 
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 I will examine property rules first.  Assume the property rule favors the victim.  
Then takers who value the bicycle at $100 are prevented from taking the bicycle; and 
since transaction costs are assumed to be high, no consensual transfers will occur.  As a 
consequence, the welfare gain forgone is the difference between the takers subjective 
valuation and the victim’s subjective valuation.   If takers choose high and low-valuing 
victims randomly, that difference is $25 ($100 - $75) in the case of a high-valuing taker.  
That is because each high-valuing taker who is forbidden from taking a bicycle forgoes a 
gain of $100, while the average victim, given random assignment, would have lost $75.  
By a similar argument, the difference is -$50 ($25 - $75) in the case of a low-valuing 
taker. 
 To simplify, assume that the numbers of high-valuing takers, high-valuing 
victims, low-valuing takers, and low-valuing victims are the same.  Then we can consider 
the average gain or loss in welfare for every taking that is prevented under the property 
rule.  When a taking is prevented, society loses on average $25 in the case of high-
valuing taker and gains on average $50 in the case of a low-valuing taker, yielding an 
overall average gain of $25.  The property rule favoring the victim results in an overall 
average gain (for each potential transfer) in welfare of $25, relative to a regime in which 
takings are permitted.  To simplify the remaining discussion, I will continue to examine 
the welfare gain per potential transfer – or equivalently the “social dividend” – as a 
method of ranking the property and liability rules. 
 Let us switch our focus to the property rule favoring the taker – taker gets to take 
whenever he wants to with no punishment or liability.  Now the high-valuing takers on 
average generate a surplus of $25 and the low-valuing takers generate an average loss in 
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surplus of $50.  The property rule favoring the taker results in an overall loss in welfare 
(on an average per-transfer basis) of $25 relative to a property rule protecting victims.  Of 
course, this is just the mirror image of the result stated for the property rule favoring the 
victim.42 
 Clearly, as between the two property rules (one favoring the victim and one 
favoring the taker), the rule favoring the victim is preferable.  Of course, this result is an 
artifact of the initial assumptions regarding the distribution of subjective valuations.  The 
result could easily change if we changed assumptions on the subjective valuations of the 
parties or of the numbers of various types.43 
 Now consider the results under liability rules.  The standard liability rule awards 
the victim $75 when his bicycle is taken by a taker.  However, as Calabresi and Melamed 
made clear, every liability rule contains within it a background entitlement assignment.44  
The liability rule that awards the victim $75 when his bicycle is taken implicitly assigns 
the entitlement to the victim.  However, there is an alternative liability rule that assigns 
the entitlement to the taker while protecting it by a liability rule.  Under the alternative 
liability rule, the taker has the right to take the bicycle, and the victim must pay the taker 
$75 to exterminate that right or to regain possession of the bicycle.45 
                                                 
42 It should be clear that the mirror-image results under the property rule protecting the victim and the 
property rule protecting the taker depend on underlying assumptions regarding the distribution of subjective 
evaluations.  If the assumptions are changed, the ranking of the two rules could change.  For example, 
suppose all takers value bicycles at $100.  Now society loses $25 when a taking is prevented under the 
property rule protecting the victim.  The property rule protecting the taker would allow society to realize 
this $25 gain, and would therefore be preferable to the property rule protecting the victim.  
43 See supra note 42. 
44 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116-1122. 
45 This is the famous “Rule Four” of Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116-1122.  For a more 
recent thorough discussion of Rule Four, see Krier and Schwab, supra note 6, 442-445 and 467-475; 
Richard Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 Yale L. J. 2091, 
2103-2105 (1997).  For frameworks expanding on Rule 4, see Krier and Schwab, supra; Saul Levmore, 
Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2149 (1997). 
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 To avoid analytical clutter, I will focus on the standard liability rule, i.e., the 
liability rule protecting the victim.  For the remainder, I will refer to this as simply the 
liability rule.  The alternative liability rule – i.e., the liability rule protecting the taker – 
will be considered in the margins. 
 Under the liability rule a high-valuing taker knows that if he takes a bicycle, he 
will be forced to pay $75 by a court. 46  His gain from taking a bicycle will be $100 - $75, 
so he will take the bicycle.  On average, society will also gain $25 as a result, since half 
of the takers will value the bicycle at $85 and the other half at $65.  A low-valuing taker 
will realize that his surplus will be $25 - $75 = -$50, so he will not take a bicycle under 
the liability rule.  Society, as a result, gains (on average) $50 for every such taking that is 
deterred by the liability rule.  The gain in welfare (or social dividend) from the transfers 
that take place and from those deterred is $25 + $50 = $75.47  Of, course, the property 
rule protecting the taker permitted high-valuing takers to acquire bicycles, increasing 
welfare by $25.  It follows that the liability rule leads to an increase of welfare over the 
property rule protecting takers by $50.  In comparison to the property rule protecting the 
victim, the liability rule increases welfare by $25.  Clearly, the liability rule is socially 
preferable to the property rule protecting the victim. 
                                                 
46 Following Kaplow and Shavell, I assume here, in order to simplify matters, that there are no enforcement 
costs. If enforcement or litigation costs are introduced into the analysis, the results on deterrence would 
have to be modified.  For example, if the cost of litigation for a plaintiff were $76, no victim who valued 
his bicycle at $65 would find it worthwhile to bring suit.  On the effects of litigation costs on deterrence, 
see Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under 
Negligence, 10 Intn’l Rev. Law & Econ. 161 (1990). 
47 As I noted before, I will consider the liability rule protecting the taker (Rule 4 of Calabresi and Melamed) 
in the margins.  Suppose the liability rule protects the taker.  This means that the taker will take and the 
victim can reacquire the bicycle by paying $75 to the taker.  Consider what happens when in the case of a 
$100-value taker.  Note that there is $35 potential gain when he takes from a low-valuing victim and a 
potential $15 gain when he takes from a high-valuing victim.  However, high-valuing victims will pay $75 
rather than suffer the loss, so society gains only $35 (compared to the initial allocation).  Similarly, for a 
low valuing taker, only the taking from a low-value victim will take place, resulting in a loss of $40 relative 
to the starting allocation.  It is therefore inferior to the liability rule protecting the victim, given the 
assumptions regarding the distribution of subjective valuations. 
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 The analysis, to this point, shows that when bargaining is infeasible (transaction 
costs high) the liability rule protecting the victim performs better than either version of 
the property rule (protecting the victim or protecting the taker).48  This analysis supports 
the general conclusions in the literature, beginning with Calabresi and Melamed and 
followed by Kaplow and Shavell.  However, the result favoring the liability rule depends 
on assumptions made about the distribution of taker and victim types.  As I will show in 
the next example, under a different set of assumptions one type of property rule may 
perform just as well as the liability rule. 
 However, the implications of this analysis are not entirely dependent on the 
specific numerical assumptions of the example studied.  The general point demonstrated 
so far is the following: 
 Proposition 1: If some takers have subjective valuations that exceed those of 
victims, then, in a high transaction cost setting, the liability rule is preferable to a 
property rule.49 
 
                                                 
48 A more complete ranking should take into account four rules: the property rule protecting the victim, the 
property rule protecting the taker, the liability rule protecting the victim, and the liability rule protecting the 
taker.  Let the symbols pv, pt, plv, and plt represent the change in welfare relative to the initial allocation for 
each rule.  With this definition, pv = $0 (since it results in no change from the initial allocation), pt  = -$25, 
plv = $25, and plt = -$2.5.  It follows that, given my assumptions, the ranking is as follows: (1) the liability 
rule protecting the victim, (2) the property rule protecting the victim, (3) the liability rule protecting the 
taker, and (4) the property rule protecting the taker.  One general conclusion suggested by this analysis is 
that whenever the property rule protecting the victim is socially desirable (i.e., increases welfare) relative 
to the property rule protecting the taker, the liability rule protecting the victim will be preferable to the 
liability rule protecting the taker.  In general, the property rule protecting the victim will be desirable 
relative to the property rule protecting the taker when the average subjective valuation of victims exceeds 
that of takers.  In the example considered in the text, the average valuation of victims is $75 and the 
average valuation of takers is $62.5. 
49 This is analogous to Gary Becker’s result regarding optimal penalties, Becker, supra note 1.  Examining 
the optimal criminal penalty, the Becker article shows that if the marginal gain to the offender sometimes 
exceeds the harm to society, the optimal penalty internalizes the losses imposed on society (i.e., the sum of 
the victim’s harm and the cost of enforcement).  See Becker, supra note 1, at 191-192.  In the example 
considered in this paper, the liability rule is equivalent to a policy of internalization.  The case of crime 
analyzed by Becker should be assumed to be a high transaction cost case, since Becker’s model does not 
incorporate bargaining between potential offenders and victims. 
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C. Changing the Distribution of Taker Types 
 
 Suppose all takers are low-value types, placing a subjective valuation on a 
bicycle of $25.  Is the liability rule preferable to either version of the property rule? 
 First, consider the liability rule.  With a damage award of $75 awaiting him, no 
low-valuing taker will take a bicycle.  This is a desirable result, because each such taking 
would reduce society’s welfare by an average of $50.  Following the approach taken 
earlier, I will say that the social dividend from the liability rule is $50. 
 Second, consider the two property rules.  Under the property rule favoring the 
victim, no takings will occur.  Thus, the property rule favoring the victim delivers a 
benefit of $50, just like the liability rule.   Under a property rule favoring the taker, 
takings will occur imposing an average loss of $50 per transfer (again, the mirror image 
result). 
 In this example, the liability rule and the property rule favoring the victim 
perform equally well.  Society should therefore be indifferent as between these two rules.  
There is a more general point to be made. 
 Proposition 2: When transaction costs are high, and all takers have subjective 
valuations that fall below those of victims, a property rule favoring the victim delivers the 
same benefits to society as would a liability rule.50 
 One might argue that the liability rule is clearly preferable as a general matter in 
the high transaction cost case because it delivers the best results no matter what 
                                                 
50 This is analogous to Becker’s result, in the crimes context, that a penalty that completely deters crime is 
appropriate when the marginal gain to offenders is always less than the marginal harm to society, see 
Becker, supra note 1, at 191.  A penalty that completely deters offenses is equivalent, in effect, to a 
perfectly functioning property rule protecting the victim. 
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assumptions are made regarding the distribution of taker types.  If some takers have 
valuations that exceed those of victims, the liability rule maximizes social welfare; and if 
no takers have valuations that exceed those of victims, the liability rule still maximizes 
social welfare.  Indeed, this is the core reason why Gary Becker argued in favor of 
internalization of victim losses as a general approach toward criminal punishment.51 
 However, even though the liability rule has the property of delivering the 
efficient result irrespective of the distribution of takers’ subjective valuations, society 
may have reasons to prefer a property rule when takers’ subjective valuations are clearly 
less than those of victims. 
 First, the property rule delivers a clearer message to victims and takers.  Rather 
than having to determine whether his subjective valuation is likely to be less than that of 
the victim, the taker receives a simple, clear message under the property rule regime: 
“don’t take”.52  This avoids wealth-diminishing takings (where the taker’s subjective 
valuation is less than the victim’s) that might occur under a liability rule because of 
misperception or ignorance53 on the part of the taker.54   
                                                 
51 For the original argument, see Becker, supra note 1.  For discussion, see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive 
Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L. J. 421, 424-430 (1998). 
52 Hume noted the importance of the clear message provided by property rules.  David Hume, Treatise of 
Human Nature 484-501 (Prometheus Books 1992) (1737). 
53 Admittedly, introducing misperception violates the “perfect information” assumption adhered to up to 
this point in the text. However, since the perfect information assumption is unlikely to be satisfied in full in 
the real world, it makes sense to consider when the liability rule imposes significantly greater informational 
requirements than the property rule (and conversely). 
54 Whence might such misperceptions derive?  Suppose low-valuing takers see high-valuing takers 
profiting from their takings.  They might mistakenly conclude that taking is profitable in general, even 
though it would not be for them.  Or, suppose takers have difficulty discerning cases in which short run 
gains are outweighed by long run losses.  See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis 55-60 (Yale Univ. Press, 1970) (describing Faustian bargain problem as distortion from 
rational behavior).  Yet another example of a possible source of misperception is the inability to put gains 
and losses into a common currency.  It was this difficulty that led Bentham to propose that punishments 
have some feature similar to the crime they were designed to deter. Bentham said that in order to encourage 
the potential offender to take his prospective penalty into account before committing an offense, a 
punishment should have some “characteristic” relating it to the offense.  See Jeremy Bentham, The 
Principles of Morals and Legislation 192 (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1988)(1781) (Punishment cannot 
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 Second, property rule protection takes advantage of the state’s investment in an 
enforcement infrastructure for its criminal laws.  Any reasonably advanced state will 
enact criminal laws and devote public resources toward enforcing those laws.  Extending 
property rule protection to those cases in which takers’ subjective valuations are all less 
than those of victims allows the state to make a fuller use of its existing enforcement 
infrastructure.  And to the extent criminal law violations will also involve instances of 
takings, where takers’ valuations fall below those of victims, property rule protection 
leads to a more productive use of enforcement agents. 
 Third, there are many instances in which the amount that should be awarded in 
liability is difficult to determine, and given this difficulty, it is more efficient to simply 
prohibit the taking when it is almost surely a drain on society’s wealth.55  For example, 
intentional takings that involve physical injury probably would fall in this category.   
 
D. Summing Up: High Transaction Costs Case 
 
 In general, when transaction costs are high, the liability rule is preferable to the 
property rule.  This result is, of course, the same as that in Calabresi and Melamed and 
Kaplow and Shavell.  However, when takers have subjective valuations that are quite 
likely to be well below those of victims a property rule works just as well as a liability 
rule, and may be preferable on many grounds.  This latter conclusion distinguishes the 
                                                                                                                                                 
act any farther than in as far as the idea of it, and of its connection with the offence, is present in the mind.  
The idea of it, if not present, cannot act at all … Now, to be present, it must be remembered, and to be 
remembered it must have been learnt…When this is the case with a punishment and an offence, the 
punishment is said to bear an analogy to, or to be characteristic of, the offence.). 
55 Even if administrative costs are zero, and even if there is no misperception or ignorance on the part of 
takers or victims, the case in which the amount of the victim’s harm is difficult to determine raises 
deterrence issues under the liability rule.  The argument follows that of footnote 53. 
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high-transaction cost examination here from that of both Calabresi and Melamed and 
Kaplow and Shavell.  These conclusions have implications for law (particularly criminal 
law) that will be addressed later in this paper. 
 
E. Market Available: Low Transaction Costs 
 
 Now let us assume that transaction costs are low.  The taker can easily bargain 
for and purchase a bicycle from the victim, rather than take it from him.  Specifically, 
assume that the costs of such a transaction amount to $0 for each party.  If a high-valuing 
taker purchases a bicycle, his surplus will be $100 less the price he pays for the bicycle.  
The surplus to the potential victim is equal the price he receives less his reservation price 
(the subjective valuation). 
 In the discussion that follows, I will examine the bargaining process and state the 
outcomes under each scenario (e.g., low-valuing victim bargains with high-valuing taker, 
high-valuing victim bargains with high-valuing taker, etc).  After setting out the 
outcomes, I will draw conclusions on the relative desirability of property and liability 
rules.  The reader who cares not to work through the details of this analysis can skip 
directly to the statements of the outcomes and the following conclusions. 
 
1. Bargaining Under Property Rules 
 First, consider the property rule (or rules).  The property rule protecting the 
victim forbids the taker from taking the victim’s bicycle.  If the taker wants the bicycle, 
he will have to bargain for it.  For a low-valuing taker, one whose subjective valuation is 
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only $25, the voluntary trade will not be attractive.  He will be forbidden from acquiring 
a bicycle.  For the high-valuing taker, his surplus from a trade is $100 minus the (final) 
price demanded by the victim.  For the victim, his potential surplus from trade with a 
high-valuing taker is the price demanded minus his subjective valuation (either $85 or 
$75). 
 Suppose the victim is a high-valuing type, which means his subjective valuation 
is $85.  Since the taker’s potential surplus is $100 minus the price demanded by the 
victim, and the victim’s potential surplus from a trade is the price demanded by the 
victim minus $85, a deal is possible for any price demand less than $100 and greater than 
$85.  In other words, the contract zone, in a bargain between a high-valuing taker and 
high-valuing victim, is the set of prices between $100 and $85.  The same argument 
allows us to see that between a high-valuing taker and low-valuing victim, the contract 
zone is from $65 to $100.  Because of the perfect bargaining assumption, deals will 
always be reached when and only when the contract zone is non-empty. 
 The outcome under the property rule protecting the victim is as follows.  Prices 
will be exchanged and only high-valuing takers will acquire bicycles, and they will do so 
through voluntary trades.  Moreover, those trades will allow each victim to receive an 
amount that is at least as great as their current subjective valuations. 
 The outcome under the property rule protecting the taker is as follows.56  Prices 
will be exchanged in cases involving low-valuing takers (victims paying takers), allowing 
                                                 
56 I said earlier in this paper that I will analyze this case in the margins.  Under a property rule protecting 
the taker, victims will have to pay the taker in order to keep their bicycles.  A high-valuing taker will 
demand a price of $100, because for any lower price he would prefer to take the bicycle.  A low-valuing 
taker will demand a price of at least $25 (assuming, recall, that he wants the bicycle for his own use and not 
to sell it on the market).  The high-valuing victim will offer a price less than $85, while the low-valuing 
victim will offer a price less than $65.  Any case involving a victim and a low-valuing taker will result in 
contract zone between $25 to $65 or in a contract zone from $25 to $85.  The contract zone in any case 
involving a high-valuing taker is empty, so they will simply take the bicycles they desire. 
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victims to keep their bicycles.   Because of these price exchanges, no low-valuing taker 
will acquire a bicycle.  High-valuing takers will acquire bicycles, and they will do so by 
taking.  The reason is that the contract zone in a bargain involving a high-valuing taker is 
always empty under the property rule protecting the taker (no victim is willing to pay 
$100 to keep his bicycle). 
 
2. Bargaining Under the Liability Rule 
 Now let us consider the liability rule.  A low-valuing taker will not take under the 
liability rule.  If he wants a bicycle, he will have to pay for it, and since his valuation is 
only $25, he will not bid for a bicycle.  A high-valuing taker will take the bicycle since he 
gets a surplus of $100 - $75 = $25.  However, a high-valuing victim can pay for the right 
to keep his bicycle, since transaction costs are low.  Since the bicycle is worth $85 to 
him, and he will receive $75 in compensation if it is taken, he will offer some price less 
than $10.  The contract zone is empty in this case, because the taker demands at least $25 
and the victim will pay no more than $10.  In the case of a low-valuing victim, the high-
valuing taker will realize that it is better to pay something between $65 and $75 and 
acquire the bicycle through a trade.57  This would be preferable to him to a taking which 
would lead to a liability of $75. 
 The outcome, under the liability rule, is that high-valuing takers will take 
bicycles from high-valuing victims and purchase them from low-valuing victims.  Note 
that this is the same final allocation observed under the two property rules, and it is the 
                                                 
57 It is also possible for the victim to offer a payment to induce taking, since his liability award will exceed 
the valuation the victim places on the bicycle.  For example, suppose the victim offers $5 to the taker to 
induce him to take the bicycle.  The surplus to the high-valuing taker is $25 + $5 = $30.  The victim gains 
from theft since he loses something he values at $65 and is awarded with a judgment of $75.  In this 
scenario, the overprotection of subjective valuations leads to unnecessarily, fraudulent litigation.  
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efficient or wealth-maximizing allocation.  The key differences observed among the rules 
appear in the direction of wealth transfers.  This invariance of final allocations is entirely 
consistent with the Coase theorem, which holds roughly that when transaction costs are 
low the efficient allocation will be realized whatever the legal rule.58 
 This analysis agrees with that of Kaplow and Shavell to the extent it finds that 
the efficient outcome is realized under every arrangement – a liability rule, a property 
rule protecting the victim, and a property rule protecting the taker.59  Kaplow and Shavell 
concluded that the outcome is efficient under every rule, and therefore there is no reason 
to prefer property rules over liability rules when transaction costs are low (and the parties 
are informed, as in this case).60  This conclusion contradicts that of Calabresi and 
Melamed, since their discussion implies that property rules are preferable to liability rules 
when transaction costs are low. 
 Since we generally do not see property rules protecting takers,61 let us confine 
our discussion to the liability rule and the property rule protecting the victim.  In spite of 
what this analysis shows about the efficiency of the final outcome, there is one very 
important difference between the property rule protecting the victim and the liability rule.  
Only under the property rule protecting the victim are victims’ subjective valuations 
                                                 
58 Coase, supra note 35. 
59 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 733-734. 
60 Id. 
61 A property rule protecting the taker would permit the taker to take without facing any punishment from 
the state or liability to the victim.  Perhaps the closest examples in the law are “information torts” such as 
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The legal standards for such torts place such 
high burdens in front of plaintiffs that they operate in effect as property rules protecting injurers.  This is 
arguably efficient, because information dissemination provides external benefits to society.  The law in 
these areas effectively give “takers” (information providers) the right to injure in the ordinary course of 
their activities, save in the relatively infrequent case in which it can be shown that they set out with an 
intent to injure a specific person. 
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protected.  Recall that under the liability rule, takings occurred and the high-valuing 
victim received $75 in compensation, while losing a bicycle he valued at $85.62 
 The failure of the liability rule to protect subjective valuations is a serious flaw.  
It was identified by Calabresi and Melamed.  The Kaplow and Shavell analysis does not 
explicitly incorporate victims’ subjective valuations and for this reason fails to identify 
this flaw in the liability rule regime.63  However, it is this flaw that provides the basis for 
preferring the property rule protecting the victim to the liability rule. 
 
F. Enforcement and Administrative Costs 
 
 The preceding analysis has examined a case in which takers and victims are 
informed as to the valuations each party puts on the property subject to taking, and also 
considered the cases in which transactions are costly and in which transactions are cheap.  
The key findings were: first, similar to that of Kaplow and Shavell, the efficient 
allocation is realized under either the liability rule or the property rule; and second, the 
liability rule, unlike the property rule protecting the victim, fails to protect the subjective 
valuations of high-valuing victims.  The second finding distinguishes the foregoing 
analysis from that of Kaplow and Shavell, and provides the basis for arguing that society 
should prefer the property rule protecting the victim to the liability rule.  In other words, 
the second finding lays the groundwork for restoring the initial conclusion of Calabresi 
                                                 
62 The low-valuing victim gains $75 and loses a bicycle he values at $65, so he actually gains from theft.  If 
their gains could be transferred to high valuing victims, there would no losses under the liability rule.   But 
I assume such a transfer would be infeasible. 
63 The Kaplow and Shavell analysis, at least in their mathematical appendix, is sufficiently general to apply 
to the case of subjective valuations.  Their decision not to analyze or discuss the underpayment (and 
sometimes overpayment) of subjective valuations may have reflected a view that the issue was not 
important. 
 27
and Melamed.  In this part, I will launch the first stage of the argument restoring 
Calabresi and Melamed by introducing enforcement (or administrative) costs. 
 Enforcement costs are incurred whenever a taking occurs and some 
administrative process must be put into effect in order to impose a liability assessment on 
the taker and transfer that sum to the victim.  The administrative process could be one of 
public enforcement, in which a government official fines the taker and transfers the fine 
to the victim, or one of largely private enforcement, in which the victim has to go to court 
to seek compensation.  Under either scenario, the administrative process is likely to 
consume some of society’s resources.64 
 Assume, then, that whenever an enforcement action occurs under the liability 
rule, society incurs a cost of $10.  To take a concrete illustration, suppose enforcement 
occurs through private litigation.  Litigation is costly because the parties have to hire 
lawyers, the lawyers have to research their cases, and courts have to devote substantial 
time and resources to the hearing and resolution of a dispute.  To simplify, I will assume 
that this $10 enforcement (or litigation) cost is borne by society as a general government 
expenditure.65 
                                                 
64 One might think that in the case of largely private enforcement, the enforcement cost might be zero 
because all suits for compensation should settle.  However, the private enforcement regime requires some 
public expenditure on courts.  And settlements happen only because of the real threat that the dispute will 
be taken into court.  Since it is costly to maintain courts, and their purpose is to ensure that the liability rule 
is enforced, the costs of court maintenance should be viewed as part of the enforcement cost.  Thus, even in 
a regime of private litigation in which all cases settle, the enforcement cost of the liability rule remains 
positive. 
65 Suppose instead that the $10 is borne by the victim/plaintiff.  This complicates matter because victims 
whose losses are less than $10 will have no incentive to bring suit, which in turn weakens deterrence.  
Thus, if the litigation cost is borne entirely or in part by the victim, then the cost of litigation itself will 
reduces social welfare and the deterrence-weakening effect will reduce social welfare further.  On the 
welfare effects of costly litigation, see Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation under 
Strict Liability, 4 American Law and Economics Review 18-43 (2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. Legal Stud. 151-
64 (1988). 
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 First, consider the property rule favoring the victim.  Recall that all bicycle trades 
occur through voluntary bargains.  The social dividend from each transaction will be 
$100 - $85 ($15) in half of the trades and $100 - $65 ($35) in the other half.  The average 
social dividend is simply $25 per transaction. 
 Next, consider the liability rule.  Recall that high-valuing takers take bicycles 
from high-valuing victims and purchase them from low-valuing victims.  High-valuing 
victims whose bicycles are taken bring lawsuits for compensation.  On average the social 
dividend from these transactions is $100 - $85 - $10 = $5 per transaction.  In the 
voluntary transactions, the social dividend is $100 - $65 = $35.  The average social 
dividend is $20 per bicycle transfer.  This is clearly lower than the social dividend per 
transfer under the property rule favoring the victim.66 
 The liability rule is inferior to the property rule favoring the victim.  The reason 
is that the liability rule fails to protect the subjective valuations of some victims, and this 
gives them an incentive to sue for compensation.  Their lawsuits impose a tax on society 
in the form of litigation and administrative costs.  The property rule protecting the victim 
is preferable to the liability rule because it forces takers to use the market, which is a 
much cheaper method of transferring property than one that requires the intervention of 
courts. 
 Introducing enforcement and administrative costs into the analysis, coupled with 
the basic flaw that liability rules do not protect subjective evaluations, returns us to the 
                                                 
66 It is important to observe that this result differs from that of Kaplow and Shavell.  Under their analysis, 
takings do not occur under the liability rule because of the perfect information and Coasean bargaining 
argument.  As a consequence, introducing enforcement costs into their analysis does not clearly change its 
conclusions. 
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position initially taken by Calabresi and Melamed.  Property rules are preferable to 
liability rules when transaction costs are low. 
 
G. Denormalization Costs 
 
 Bentham referred to “secondary costs” as a category including the general 
incentive effects created by takings67 – e.g., the “deadening of industry”.68  Michelman 
refers to the same problem with the narrower though more communicative term 
“demoralization costs”.69  The category of secondary costs can also include expenditures 
on protection or avoidance,70 and any other expenditures made in anticipation of a 
possible taking, including those made by the potential taker.  Thus, the reduction in 
incentives to produce that would normally occur as a result of rampant theft is only one 
component within the general category of secondary costs. 
 Because the term “secondary costs” fails to communicate the nature of the 
problem, I will group all of these costs under the title denormalization costs.   Since 
normalization usually implies a stabilization of some arrangement, denormalization 
implies destabilization, which is what occurs when property rules are not respected. 
 Denormalization costs are realized, in this analysis, because the liability rule fails 
to protect subjective valuations.  Knowing that a taking will result in a non-compensable 
loss of $10, high-valuing victims will have less incentive to invest in the upkeep of their 
                                                 
67 Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, at 153. 
68 Bentham, Security and Equality, supra note 4, at 54 (discussing ‘evils which result from violations of 
property”.) 
69 Michelman, supra note 14. 
70 Becker, supra note 1, at 171 (presenting table showing some private outlays on avoidance, such as 
security guards and alarms, amounting to roughly $2 billion in 1965). 
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bicycles.  Alternatively, they will have a greater incentive to invest in locks and 
protective technology.71  Potential takers, on the other hand, will have a greater incentive 
to invest in the technology of taking.  These incentives are created by the risk of a taking 
that leads to an uncompensated loss. 
 Imagine summing all of these incentive costs into a large lump sum and dividing 
them up on a per transfer basis.  Think of what this would do to the social divided per 
transfer under the liability rule.  It is quite likely that on a per transfer basis these costs 
would be substantial, and quite a bit larger than the cost of conducting a transaction.72  As 
long as the transaction cost is less than the per transfer denormalization cost, society 
should prefer the property rule protecting the victim to the liability rule.73 
 This leads to the last conclusion for the case in which bargaining is feasible and 
information perfect: 
 Proposition 3: When transaction costs are low, the property rule protecting the 
victim is preferable to the liability rule. 
 
H. Reexamining the Case of No Subjective Valuations 
                                                 
71 Posner, discussing the implications of the Kaplow and Shavell article, mentions the greater precautionary 
incentives of property holders whose harms would not be fully compensated by the damage remedy.  
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 13, at 69. 
72 Suppose litigation is costless, so the only costs that we need consider now are denormalization costs.  Let 
the per-transfer denormalization cost be X.  Finally, suppose a liability rule is in effect.  When a high-
valuing victim loses a bicycle from theft to a high-valuing taker, the change in welfare is $100 - $85 – X = 
$15 – X.  When a transaction takes place with a low-valuing victim, the social dividend is $100 - $65 = 
$35.  On average, then, the social dividend is $25 – X/2.  For any positive X, this is clearly less than the 
social dividend per transfer under the property rule ($25 in this example).  Of course, if transactions have a 
positive cost (though still low), one should compare the per-transfer denormalization cost X to he per-
transfer transaction cost. 
73 See Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 Int’l 
Rev. L. & Econ. 367 (1997) (if cost of disincentive effects outweighs transaction cost, prohibition is 
optimal).  See also Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and the Benefits from Crime, 13 Int’l Rev. L 
& Econ. 225 (1993); Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law, 
Review of Law and Economics, forthcoming, 2005. 
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 What should we say of an analysis that excludes explicit consideration of 
victims’ subjective valuations?  Should one be entirely confident of the conclusion, 
suggested in the literature and in the foregoing discussion,74 that society should be 
indifferent as between the property rule and the liability rule when transaction costs are 
low (and information perfect)?  There are reasons to be wary of accepting even this 
conclusion. 
 Return to the example discussed in the previous parts, and suppose there are no 
subjective portions of value on the victim’s side.  In other words, there are no high-
valuing or low-valuing victims; each victim places the same valuation of $75 on his 
bicycle.  Much of the preceding analysis goes through as before.  However, consider the 
case of a high-valuing taker bargaining with a victim.  The high-valuing taker could take 
the bicycle and pay damages, which gives him a payoff of $100 - $75 = $25.  
Alternatively, the high-valuing taker could bargain and pay $75 for the bicycle, giving 
him the same payoff. 
 If, as I assumed earlier, the state bears the cost of enforcement or litigation, the 
high-valuing taker is indifferent between taking and purchasing at $75.  No subjective 
valuations are expropriated under either approach.  Given that each taker is indifferent as 
between taking and paying, some will take and some will pay $75.  Where high-valuing 
takers take, victims will bring suit, again forcing society to bear the enforcement costs.  
The property rule is preferable to the liability rule. 
                                                 
74 The Kaplow and Shavell article, as I noted earlier, presents a model that does take subjective valuations 
into account.  However, their analysis, and that of the new bargaining theory literature generally, does not 
explicitly take up the problem of protecting subjective valuations. 
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 This example shows that even if subjective valuations are not expropriated, if any 
takings would occur under the liability rule, the property rule is socially preferable to the 
liability rule.  The reason is that takings lead to costly enforcement (e.g., litigation), 
which taxes society’s wealth.  But the example relies on two assumptions that should be 
relaxed: that the state bears the cost of litigation and that the victim settles for the 
objective market value of $75. 
 Let us consider what happens under the assumption that the cost of litigation is 
shared between the taker and the victim.  Suppose the total cost of litigation is split 
evenly, with the taker paying $5 and the victim paying $5 in litigation expenses.  The 
high-valuing taker gets a surplus of $20 if he takes and pays damages ($100 - $5 -$75).  
This implies that if the victim tries to demand more than $80 for the bicycle, the taker 
will simply take it.  It follows that the contract zone under the liability rule is the set of 
exchange prices between $75 and $80.75  Recall that the contract zone under the property 
rule is between $75 and $100. 
 As this example suggests, if victims’ subjective valuations are equal to the 
objective market value of $75, k is the cost of litigation, and γ the share of the total 
litigation cost borne by the taker, the contract zone under the liability rule is the set of 
prices greater than or equal to $75 and less than or equal to $75 + (1- γ)k.  Clearly, 
whenever the share of the total litigation cost borne by the taker is zero, he is indifferent 
between taking and bargaining, so takings may occur, taxing society’s wealth.  However, 
if the taker bears some share of the total litigation cost, he can do better by bargaining 
                                                 
75 Note that if the taker takes the bicycle, the victim loses $5.  This suggests that the taker could drive the 
exchange price down almost to $70.  In other words, the contract zone under the liability rule could change 
to the range of prices between $70 and $80.  However, this assumes strategic behavior, which is ruled out 
at this stage, because I am assuming perfect bargaining. 
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rather than taking.  Under the perfect bargaining assumption adhered to so far, there will 
be no takings, no expropriations of subjective value, and no litigation. 
 One might conclude, then, that when victims’ subjective valuations are the same 
as the objective market value, as long as the taker bears some part of the litigation or 
enforcement cost, he will prefer to bargain and takings will not occur.  It would seem to 
follow from this that under these conditions the liability and property rules lead to the 
same results in terms of social welfare. 
 However, this rather narrow, special-case conclusion favoring the liability rule is 
invalid for two reasons.  The first is the problem of cognitive dissonance (or, perhaps 
more broadly, bounded rationality),76 and the second is investment incentives (or 
denormalization costs, again).  To see the cognitive dissonance problem, return to the 
case in which the total cost of litigation is split evenly, so the taker will prefer to take 
whenever the victim’s price demand exceeds $80.  The victim may think that if a taker 
approaches him with a price offer of $75, that the taker is committed to bargaining, so he 
may as well respond with a counter-offer of $85.  Anticipating that some victims might 
respond to an offer with a counter-offer, the high-valuing taker may decide that he should 
                                                 
76 Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957); George 
A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 American 
Economic Review 307-319 (1982).  Cognitive dissonance results when an agent chooses an action and then 
develops certain hypotheses to justify that action.  He then continues to adhere to those hypotheses even 
when the evidence goes against them.  In the example in the text, a victim who chooses to bargain with a 
taker may continue to adhere to his starting-point hypothesis even when his demand price has gone up to 
$80.  But at that point, he is no longer a bargainer in the eyes of the taker, he is an imminent victim of a 
taking.  Admittedly, this violates the perfect information assumption that I have adhered to so far, but (as I 
noted in footnote 53) it is entirely reasonable to consider when one rule (liability or property) imposes 
significantly greater informational burdens than the other. 
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never bargain, simply take in every case.77  That leads to litigation, again costing society.  
Once gain, the property rule is preferable to the liability rule. 
 The other reason to reject the conclusion that property rules and liability rules are 
equivalent when victims’ subjective valuations are all the same as the objective valuation 
is because of investment incentives.  Again, suppose the total cost of litigation ($10) is 
split evenly between taker and victim.  Assume each victim, in order to avoid takings and 
litigation, demands no more than $80 for the bicycle.  Transfers occur without takings, 
and no litigation costs are realized.  In this case, the property rule does not appear at first 
glance to be preferable to the liability rule.  However, the reason this is so is that the 
victim is, in essence, bullied by the law into accepting a price of no more than $80 even 
though he knows that the taker enjoys the lion’s share of the entire bargain surplus.  In 
effect, the liability rule sets up conditions under which the victim is forced to give up 
almost all of the bargain surplus to the taker.  To call such an outcome efficient is 
shortsighted, for the reason that follows. 
 In the scenario in which all victims sell at $75, avoiding litigation costs, no 
victim gets to seek to share in the bargain surplus.  But the prospect of sharing in the 
bargain surplus is widely considered to be one of the benefits of ownership.  The property 
rule allows possessors to make investments in anticipation of eventually sharing in the 
bargain surplus from a sale in the future.78  The liability rule, in contrast, encourages 
                                                 
77 The general point here is that the liability rule requires the victim to process a great deal of information in 
order for perfect bargaining to occur.  The victim has to calculate when his price demand hits the point at 
which the taker will quit the bargaining table and resort to a taking.  Boundedly rational agents are unlikely 
to be able to process so much information.  In contrast, the property rule requires far less information in 
order to conduct perfect (or successful) bargaining. 
78 Consider, for example, the sale of a house.  Suppose the market value of the house, based on local 
comparables, is $100,000 (and this is also the owner’s subjective valuation).  However, there are many 
instances in which an owner makes investments into property that do not result in an increase in the market 
value of the property.  Suppose, for example, the owner develops a beautiful garden.  The owner may know 
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takers to make investments in anticipation of eventually consuming virtually the entire 
bargain surplus from future transactions.  Takers will anticipate getting virtually the 
entire bargain surplus because the threat of a taking will loom like a brandished sword 
over every transaction.  This encourages more people to become takers over time, and 
long-time takers to invest more into the absolutely unproductive technology of taking.79  
Given these long-term investment incentives, the property rule is preferable to the 
liability rule.80 
 
IV. Transactions, Imperfect Information, and Bargaining Failure Generally 
 
 The foregoing discussion has examined the perfect bargaining case in which the 
cost of meeting to bargain is low, the subjective valuations of takers and victims were 
known by all parties as well as all other information necessary to reach agreement, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the average buyer may not be willing to pay more for a house with a beautiful garden, but that there is 
also a subset of potential buyers who will bid above the market for such a property.  Under the property 
rule, the owner can invest in his garden, knowing that he may be able to share in the bargain surplus if a 
potential buyer who loves gardens comes along.  This example suggests that the property rule leads to 
efficient matching that fails to occur under the liability rule, and this efficient matching supports investment 
incentives. 
79 Consider, for example, a state that uses the power of eminent domain to transfer property from one 
private party to another for a “private” use, such as a shopping mall.  Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. __ 
(2005).  Shopping mall developers would have incentives under this liability rule regime to search for 
private parcels that could be efficiently developed, and to lobby government officers to gain their support in 
the transfer process.  The investments in the lobbying process are pure rent-seeking expenditures, 
investments into the technology of taking, and one should expect those expenditures to increase following 
the Kelo decision. 
80 Indeed, in a regime in which takers always enjoy the entire bargain surplus, one would imagine that 
victims would attempt to find a way to opt out of the regime entirely or to retaliate against perceived 
injustices.  One long-standing theory of the purpose of damage awards is to secure peace, by reducing the 
incentive of victims to retaliate against injurers.  See Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (R.L. Meek 
et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978)(1762-66) 106-110.  But in order to secure peace in the property 
context, damage awards should protect potential victims from expropriation.  As I have suggested, there are 
unavoidable denormalization costs that are associated with the liability rule.  The only way to avoid these 
costs is to have a setting in which the subjective valuations of both takers and victims are equal to the 
objective market value.  But in that peculiar special case, there would be no incentive for trade.  In short, 
the Kaplow-Shavell analysis collapses to a pinpoint. 
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there is no strategic behavior.  Bargaining is always successful in this case, in the sense 
that the parties always reach an agreement.81  In this part I will briefly consider the 
imperfect information case in which the subjective valuations of takers and victims are 
private information.  In other words, a taker bargaining with a victim for his bicycle may 
not know the victim’s subjective valuation, and the victim may not know the taker’s 
subjective valuation.  In the imperfect information setting, bargaining may be 
unsuccessful or fail, in the sense that the parties fail to reach an agreement. 
 The bargaining theory literature, especially the contribution by Kaplow and 
Shavell, has extended the analysis of Calabresi and Melamed by looking carefully at the 
bargaining process, especially the imperfect information case.  As I noted in the last 
section, bargaining theory implies that property rules and liability rules are equivalent 
when transaction costs are low (and information perfect) – though, as I have also noted, 
the Calabresi-Melamed preference for property rules is restored when the costs that result 
from failing to protect subjective valuations are taken into account.  In the imperfect 
information setting, the bargaining theory literature reaches an ambiguous conclusion: it 
is not clear that the property rule is preferable the liability rule.82 
 I will offer here a brief informal account of the Kaplow and Shavell analysis of 
the imperfect information case, for two reasons.   The first is to help support my claim 
that the property rule protecting the victim is preferable to the liability rule when 
transaction costs are low.  The second reason is to set up the basic analysis of imperfect 
                                                 
81 The complete information case assumes that there are no costs that prevent people from meeting to 
bargain, and no informational or incentive impediments to bargaining.  Given these assumptions, as long as 
there is a (non-empty) set of potential mutually-beneficial allocations that the parties can find, it is assumed 
that they will find an allocation within that set through the bargaining process. 
82  See generally Ayres and Talley; Ayres and Goldbart; Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 735. 
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information, though informally, in order to return to it when examining the positive 
implications of this paper’s analysis. 
 Consider the case of uniform victim valuations of $75, and two types of high-
valuing takers with valuations of $100 and $80, and one type of low-valuing taker with a 
value of $25.  The efficient outcome is one in which the high-valuing takers acquire 
bicycles and the low-valuing takers do not.  Suppose there is a property rule protecting 
the victim.  Suppose bargaining occurs with the victim making a take-it-or-leave-it 
demand.83  The victim, not knowing which sort of taker he faces may choose to make a 
demand of $99, taking his chance that the large surplus he earns from deals with takers 
who value the bicycle at $100 will outweigh the lost opportunities for trade with takers 
who value the bicycle at $80.84  As a result, some bargains will fail involving takers who 
value the bicycle at $80.  The efficiency loss is equal to the number of such failed 
bargains multiplied by the forgone surplus of $5 ($80 - $75). 
 Trades must take place under the liability rule too in order to reach efficient 
outcomes.  Suppose now that the victims’ subjective valuations are $100 and $50, leading 
to an average used for liability purposes of $75.  There are two types of taker, one with a 
valuation of $80 and the other with a valuation of $95.  It would be inefficient for either 
of these takers to acquire the bicycle of the victim whose valuation is $100.  Yet, the 
liability rule gives them an incentive to try.  Given this incentive, the high-valuing victim 
                                                 
83 See Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 732. 
84 To be precise, the victim has a choice to make one of two demands: he can make a demand of $99 or a 
demand of $79.  If the victim demands $99, only the $100-value takers will accept the bid, giving the 
victim a gain of $24 from the deal.  If he demands $79, all high-valuing takers will accept the bid (both the 
$80-value and the $100-value takers), giving the victim a gain of $4 in each deal.  Suppose for example, the 
proportion of $100-value takers among the group of high-valuing takers is 40 percent.  The payoff to the 
victim from demanding $99 is (.4)($24) = $9.6.  The payoff from demanding $79 is $4.  Since in this case 
the payoff from demanding $99 exceeds that from demanding $79, the victim will demand $99.  In general, 
in this example, if the proportion of $100-value takers (among the group of high-valuing takers) exceeds 
16.7 percent, the victim will make the $99 demand. 
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has a corresponding incentive to offer a payment to the takers in exchange for a 
commitment not to take.  Suppose, then, the high-valuing victim makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer of $6,85 in the hope that the surplus enjoyed from these bargains will 
outweigh the loss from failed bargains.86  Again, there will be failed bargains and 
inefficient takings will occur. 
 Without having firm notions of the frequency of inefficient outcomes and the 
social cost of each one, it is impossible to say whether the efficiency losses are greater 
under the property rule or under the liability rule.  Hence, Kaplow and Shavell’s 
ambiguity proposition: the property rule and the liability rule cannot be ranked in terms 
of welfare when transaction costs are low and information imperfect.  This conclusion is 
also implied by the Ayres and Talley analysis – and for this reason should be taken as a 
central claim of the new bargaining theory literature.   
 There are two responses to the bargaining theory literature’s proposition that 
property rules and liability rules cannot be ranked in welfare terms in the imperfect 
information setting (i.e., the ambiguity proposition).  The first is that it is not clear at all 
that the ambiguity proposition contradicts Calabresi and Melamed.  The second is that the 
law itself has responded to the ambiguity problem in various settings, sometimes by 
modifying the property rule, and in others by choosing the liability rule over the property 
                                                 
85 Note that if the high-valuing victim offers the taker $6 to the $80-value taker, he will agree not to take 
the bicycle.  Why?  If he takes the bicycle, he gets a bicycle worth $80 to him, but must pay a damage 
award of $75, leaving him a surplus of $5.  He is better off accepting $6 and agreeing not to take the 
bicycle.  On the other hand, the $100-value taker would get a surplus of $25 from the theft, so he would not 
accept an offer of $6 in exchange for an agreement not to take. 
86 To be precise, the high-valuing victim has a choice of two offers: $6, allowing the victim to enjoy a 
surplus of $19 on each trade with an accepting taker (because without such an offer he loses $25 each 
time), or $21, allowing him to enjoy a surplus of $4 on trades with every taker (since all would accept in 
this example).  Note that when a taker rejects his offer, the victim loses $25 (because the taker takes the 
victim’s bicycle).  Suppose the proportion of $100-value takers is 90 percent.  Then the strategy of offering 
$6 has an average payoff of (.9)($19) + (.10)(-$25) = $14.6.  The strategy of offering $21 has an average 
payoff of $4.  Given this, the high-valuing victim will offer $6, because the gain from making deals with a 
large surplus outweighs the loss from forgone trades.   
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rule.  In other words, where bargaining failure is a serious problem – because of 
information or incentive impediments – the law has responded to the problem by 
deviating from the simple property rule protecting the victim. 
 Let us first examine the extent to which the ambiguity proposition contradicts the 
general claim of Calabresi and Melamed that the property rule is preferable to the liability 
rule when transaction costs are low.  The proposition appears to contradict Calabresi and 
Melamed at first glance.  However, one could easily argue that imperfect information is 
just a type of transaction cost, so that the incomplete information case should be 
considered one of high transaction costs.  Indeed, Calabresi and Melamed note early in 
their article that the “no transaction cost” case should be understood as the case involving 
“both perfect knowledge and the absence of any impediments or costs of negotiating”.87  
To introduce information imperfections to the analysis, as the new bargaining theory 
literature does, is to immediately step away from the assumptions Calabresi and Melamed 
attached to the low transaction cost scenario.   
 Moreover, the ambiguity proposition itself is arguably implied by Calabresi and 
Melamed’s discussion.  Consider, for example, Calabresi and Melamed’s discussion of 
the hold-out problem in property transactions.88  The hold-out problem is an example of a 
setting in which bargains fail under conditions that are quite similar to the imperfect 
information setting – in the sense that the cost of meeting to bargain is low but the 
likelihood of bargaining failure is high.  The hold-out problem occurs when one party is 
trying to purchase several parcels from a group of land owners.  Suppose, for example, 
there are ten parcels of land owned by different individuals, each of whom places a value 
                                                 
87 Calabresi and Melamed, at 1095. 
88 Id. at 1106-1108. 
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of $1000 on the parcel.  A town or municipal corporation realizes that a park made up all 
ten parcels would provide a total benefit of $100,000 to its residents.89  One or more 
landowners may have an incentive to hold out for a substantial share of the entire 
bargaining surplus ($90,000).  If the hold-out problem is severe, transactions of this sort 
will fail.  The law responds to the hold-out problem by replacing the property rule that 
would ordinarily apply with a liability rule known as eminent domain.90 
 Calabresi and Melamed’s discussion of the hold-out problem suggests that the 
eminent domain rule is an appropriate (or welfare-enhancing) alternative to the property 
rule when the hold-out problem is likely to be substantial, and otherwise not.91  In other 
words, their discussion suggests that the property rule protecting the victim and the 
liability rule cannot be unambiguously ranked in terms of welfare in the presence of the 
hold-out problem.  Since the hold-out and imperfect information cases are analytically 
homologous, in the sense that both involve settings in which the cost of meeting is low 
but the likelihood of bargaining failure substantial, the ambiguity proposition is implicit 
in the Calabresi and Melamed analysis. 
 This is a good place to generalize the argument.  There are three settings in 
which the cost of actually meeting to bargain is low but the likelihood of bargain failure 
high.  One is the imperfect information case examined in the bargaining theory literature.  
Another is the hold-out and free-rider case examined by Calabresi and Melamed.  A third 
is the case in which the entitlement itself is difficult to define, which we observe in the 
                                                 
89 This example is similar to that discussed in Calabresi and Melamed, supra, but I have changed the 
numerical assumptions. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
 41
nuisance context.92  We can put all of these cases under a general category of 
intermediate transaction costs.  This distinguishes these cases from the high transaction 
cost setting, in which the parties generally find it infeasible to even negotiate, and from 
the traditional low transaction cost setting in which parties generally can reach an 
agreement.  In the intermediate transaction cost setting, we find that liability rules are 
sometimes preferable to property rules. 
 Now let us consider the implications of intermediate transaction costs (imperfect 
information, hold-outs, indefinite entitlements) for the more general argument of this 
paper.  Intermediate transaction cost analysis gives us no reason to prefer the liability rule 
over the property rule as a general matter.  It therefore follows that incorporating this 
analysis does not change the basic conclusion of the foregoing examination.  The 
property rule (protecting the victim) is preferable to the liability rule because it protects 
subjective valuations, and because it does so it avoids the enforcement and 
denormalization costs that would be observed under a liability rule regime.  Introducing 
intermediate transaction cost cases to the analysis provides no clear reason to overturn 
this conclusion.  Where the inefficiencies resulting from bargaining failure are relatively 
mild or infrequent, society clearly should put more weight on the subjective valuation 
protecting function of property rules.93  On the other hand, where the inefficiencies from 
bargaining failure are relatively severe, society can replace the property rule with the 
liability rule (or some modified version of the property rule) in order to avoid the social 
costs of bargaining failure. 
                                                 
92 Merrill, supra note 7. 
93 What matters most here is the ratio of the cost of bargaining failure and the cost of failing to protect 
subjective valuations.  If the ratio is close to one – say because both costs are high – there is no reason to 
replace the property rule with a liability rule.  Indeed, in many instances in which bargaining failure costs 
are high, the costs resulting from expropriation will be high too.  
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 In general, where the law can intervene to actually alter the bargaining process in 
a way that makes bargaining failure less likely, it should incorporate such interventions 
and retain the property rule.94  Such a modification of the property rule would retain its 
subjective-value protective function and at the same time reduce and perhaps eliminate 
the costs of bargaining failure.  On the other hand, where the law cannot intervene to alter 
the bargaining process, the appropriate response may be to replace the property rule with 
the liability rule, provided the likelihood and cost of bargaining failure are sufficiently 
high.  Examples of both types of deviations from the property rule are observed in the 
law.  Labor law, for example, actually intervenes to regulate the bargaining process, and 
can do so because of the sequential nature of the bargaining process.95  In the labor law 
setting, one observes a modified property rule, designed to dampen incentives to engage 
in strategic behavior.  The other settings, where the law generally cannot intervene to 
regulate the bargaining process and the expected costs of bargaining failure are 
substantial, are exemplified by the eminent domain and nuisance settings.  In those cases, 
one observes the law replacing the traditional property rule with a liability rule. 
 I will return to the incomplete information case later in this paper to illustrate the 
property rule’s potential advantage over the liability rule in this setting.  Specifically, the 
property rule can be modified to dampen incentives to engage in strategic behavior.96  In 
                                                 
94 For an analysis of alternative property rules that is consistent with this view, see Richard A. Epstein, 
Takings, Commons and Associations: Why the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, forthcoming 
Yale L. J. 
95 Labor law is an area where incomplete information has a substantial impact on bargaining.  The law has 
responded to this by adopting special rules that regulate the bargaining process.  For discussion, see Part 
VI.D of this paper.  Wachter and Cohen, supra note 7; Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory of the Duty 
to Bargain, 83 Geo L. J. 19 (1994). 
96 If the liability rule were modified in the same way, in order to dampen strategic conduct, it would still 
fail to protect subjective valuations, and for that reason remain unambiguously inferior to the property rule. 
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this case, introducing incomplete information may enhance the argument in favor of the 
property rule. 
 
V. Harmful Externalities 
 
 I have focused so far on the case in which a taker seeks to acquire property of the 
victim.  I have not formally considered the case of harmful externalities, injuries imposed 
on victims as a byproduct of the injurer’s activity.  In the case of a harmful externality, 
the injurer engages in an activity that imposes a risk of harm on the victim.  By taking 
care the injurer can reduce the likelihood of harm to the victim.  One typical example of a 
harmful externality setting is driving.  The driver (injurer) imposes a risk of harm on a 
pedestrian (victim) when he drives down a street that is also used by pedestrians.  The 
driver can reduce the likelihood of harm by driving carefully; but there is always a risk 
that a pedestrian will be injured by the driver no matter how carefully he drives.  
Pollution generated as a byproduct of some productive activity is another typical example 
of a harmful externality. 
 If we take the analysis of the preceding sections and re-label terms, we will see 
that the analysis applies with virtually no changes to the harmful externality setting.  
Wherever the analysis refers to the taker’s subjective valuation, one should simply 
replace it with a reference to the “injurer’s cost of care”.  References to the victim’s 
subjective valuation should be replaced by a reference to the victim’s harm (or the 
monetary value of the victim’s injury).   
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 The conclusions of the analysis of takings apply in a straightforward way to the 
case of injuries caused by harmful externalities.  First, divide the transaction cost 
assumptions into three categories: high (where bargaining is infeasible), low (where 
bargaining is feasible and agreement likely to be reached), and intermediate (bargaining 
is feasible but there are informational and incentive impediments to reaching agreement).  
Whenever transaction costs are high and the cost of care for some injurers exceeds the 
maximum harm suffered by a victim, the liability rule is best (efficient).  However, if the 
cost of care for all injurers is less than the minimum harm suffered by victims, a property 
rule operates just as efficiently as a liability rule.  In the intermediate case, a liability rule 
may be preferable to a property rule if, as in the nuisance setting, the likelihood of 
bargaining failure is high.  Finally, if transaction costs are low, the property rule 
protecting the victim is superior to the liability rule. 
 Indeed, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the argument in favor of the property 
rule is in some respects stronger in the harmful externality context than in the takings 
context.  The reason is that harmful externalities will often involve direct physical harms 
to individuals.  For example, the risk a driver imposes on pedestrians is a risk of serious 
physical harm – e.g., having a leg or an arm knocked off.  Takings, on the other hand, 
will often involve theft of property rather than a physical injury.97  Since harmful 
                                                 
97 Obviously, some physical injuries are intentional and could be characterized as takings.  Perhaps one 
straightforward example would be someone who steals a body part (e.g., a kidney) from another person.  
See W. Roughhead, Classic Crimes 68-104 (New York: Vintage Books, 1951) (detailing the story of Burke 
and Hare, the Edinburgh murderers who killed more than sixteen people in order to sell their bodies to 
medical institutions).  One special feature of body part theft is that it arises in part because the sale of body 
parts is prohibited.  Prohibition creates a shortage in which the demand for body parts far exceeds the 
supply, which provides incentives for the creation of a black market.  The black market, in turn, provides 
incentives for theft – since it rewards body-part providers equally whether they acquired parts through theft 
or through good faith bargaining.  
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externalities will so often involve physical injuries, the subjective valuation problem will 
be present in a large percentage of the harmful externality cases.   
 Take the case of a car accident that destroys the victim’s arm.  What value should 
be given to the victim’s arm?  It should be clear that the subjective valuation demanded 
by the victim in a hypothetical trade would exceed the objective value most courts would 
try to determine in the damages phase of a lawsuit.98  It follows that the liability rule 
grossly under-protects subjective valuations in cases of liability for physical harm.  In 
spite of this, the liability rule is often the only feasible rule-type available, because 
transaction costs are too high for ex ante bargaining to take place in most harmful 
externality settings. 
 One immediate positive implication of this argument is that there will be 
continual pressure to get liability rules, in the physical harm setting, to mimic the 
protection provided by property rules.  But this comes at a significant cost, since the 
uncertainty created by this mimicking effort discourages legitimate activity.  Of course, 
to the extent that this pressure to mimic leads to an increase in damage awards, it may 
have a beneficial effect on incentives to take care.  We observe this mimicking effort in 
the area of pain and suffering awards.99 
                                                 
98 This point is obscured somewhat by the probabilistic nature of most accidental injuries.  In many cases, 
the risk of an injury is relatively low, so the potential victim may not ask for much in a hypothetical bargain 
because the likelihood of the injury being realized is tiny.  But suppose the risk of injury is high – say fifty 
percent.  Many victims would refuse any price to accept this risk, and those that do agree to bargain would 
probably demand a price that exceeds a damage award based on projected earnings losses.  In addition to 
projected earnings losses, the potential victim would want to be compensated ex ante for the projected loss 
in utility experienced by being unable to participate fully in many recreational activities, and for the option 
value of the arm (e.g., the possibility that the victim, if he had both arms, might later become an excellent 
pianist).  Setting pain and suffering awards aside, objective damage awards do not attempt to compensate 
for the utility deficit and option value associated with the loss of a limb.    
99 Consider, for example, pain and suffering awards for medical malpractice.  To the extent that they lead to 
an increase in damage awards, they may provide doctors with greater incentives to take care.  On the other 
hand, suppose pain and suffering awards cause medical malpractice liability rates to increase significantly 
because they are unpredictable.  Increased malpractice rates will discourage doctors from entering high-risk 
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VI. Implications for Law 
 
 The conclusions of the foregoing analysis can be summarized easily.  To 
simplify, I will refer to only one property rule, that protecting the victim, and I will refer 
to it as “the property rule”.  At the risk of repetition, putting the conclusions of the 
preceding sections together, we have: 
 Property Rule versus Liability Rule Theorem: When transaction costs are high 
(in the sense that bargaining is generally infeasible) and some takers have subjective 
valuations that exceed those of victims, the liability rule is preferable to the property rule 
(protecting the victim).  When transaction costs are high and victims’ subjective 
valuations exceed those of all takers, the property rule is equivalent to the liability rule.  
When transaction costs are low (in the sense that bargaining is both feasible and there 
are no informational or incentive impediments to reaching agreement), the property rule 
is preferable to the liability rule.  When transaction costs are intermediate (in the sense 
that bargaining is feasible but there are informational or incentive impediments to 
reaching agreement), the property rule is preferable to the liability rule if the costs of 
failing to protect subjective valuations exceed the costs of bargaining failure. 
 This is a more complicated prescription than Calabresi and Melamed delivered, 
but the basic components of these propositions are implicit in their analysis.  This paper 
has shown that in light of recent bargaining theory analyses, certain elements (e.g., the 
distribution of subjective valuations) of the Calabresi-Melamed analysis are more 
                                                                                                                                                 
specialties.  In this example, the attempt to use liability rules to mimic the protection provided by property 
rules could reduce social welfare – if the discouragement effect outweighs the care incentive effect. 
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important than was previously assumed.  The key features of the revised propositions are 
assumptions regarding the distribution of transaction costs and of subjective valuations. 
 In the remainder, I will examine the implications of this revised “property rule 
versus liability rule theorem” for some familiar areas of the law. 
 
A. Property Rules, Liability Rules and Tort Law 
 
 Property rules are preferable to liability rules when transaction costs are low 
because they protect subjective valuations, and by doing so, avoid enforcement costs and 
denormalization costs that would otherwise be generated under a liability rule.  In the 
torts and property settings, the low transaction cost assumption generally applies to 
potential takings of real or personal property. 
 It follows from this basic proposition (part of the original Calabresi-Melamed 
analysis) that property rules are preferable to liability rules in settings where potential 
invaders or takers seek to acquire the real or personal property of other individuals.  The 
law conforms to this prediction: trespass law operates as a property rule.  Under trespass 
law, the victim can enjoin an invasion and hold the invader or taker strictly liable for the 
harm suffered.  Moreover, the state, through its law enforcement agents, contributes 
directly to the enforcement of trespass laws.  Since trespass is typically a part of the 
criminal code of most jurisdictions,100 the victim can gain the aid of public enforcement 
agents in enforcing his right to exclusive possession of real or personal property. 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Ala.Code 1975 § 13A-7-2 (“a. A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree if he 
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling. b. Criminal trespass in the first degree is a Class A 
misdemeanor”); Col. C.R.S.A. § 18-4-502 (“A person commits the crime of first degree criminal trespass if 
such person knowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling of another or if such person enters 
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 One implication of property rule theory is that the rule should include a shield 
against invaders or takers who attempt to assert a liability rule against the possessor.  For 
example, a trespasser who injures himself on the possessor’s property could, by suing for 
damages, try to assert liability rule protection against the possessor.  Alternatively, a 
trespasser who has injured the possessor’s property could attempt to shift the liability to 
the possessor on contributory fault grounds, as in LeRoy Fibre.101  However, to reward 
these efforts would allow the trespasser to expropriate part of the possessor’s property.  
The value of the possessor’s property would fall, to the extent the law protects the 
trespasser.  The trespasser’s wealth would increase. 
 Consistent with the theory of property rule protection, the law generally does not 
permit a trespasser to assert liability rule protection against the possessor of land.102  In 
general, a landowner has no duty to take care to avoid injuring a trespasser.103 
                                                                                                                                                 
any motor vehicle with intent to commit a crime therein. First degree criminal trespass is a class 5 felony”). 
For the Model Penal Code provision governing trespass, see MPC § 221.2 (1) (A person commits an 
offence if knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in any 
building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof. An offence under this 
Subsection is a misdemeanour if it is committed in a dwelling at night. Otherwise it is a petty 
misdemeanour.) 
101 LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914). 
102 A trespasser might assert liability rule protection against a possessor of land in two ways.   One is if the 
trespasser is harmed due to some condition of the property.  In this case, the trespasser could assert liability 
rule protection by bringing a negligence claim against the possessor.   The other way a trespasser could 
assert liability rule protection is in the course of defending himself against a suit for damages caused by his 
trespass.  In this case, the trespasser could assert liability rule protection by claiming the possessor’s harms 
were due to his own contributory negligence.  Both attempts to assert liability rule protection have been 
rejected by courts.  See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897)(no duty to a 
trespasser); LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914) (no duty on part 
of landowner to take steps to avoid or minimize harm to his property caused by negligent or intentional 
invasion of another). 
103 I refer to the duty to take care to avoid injuring a trespasser, not to the duty to avoid intentionally 
injuring a trespasser.  Although there is no duty on the landholder’s part to take care, the landholder does 
have a duty to refrain from intentionally injuring the trespasser.  E.g., Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co., 
44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897).  Some states have moved away from the traditional rule absolving the landowner of 
a responsibility to take care to avoid injury to a trespasser.  See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 
(Cal. 1968)(general negligence principles apply in case of trespasser).  And there is another exception for 
attractive nuisances, Sioux City & Pacific R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 647 (1873). 
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 Liability rules are generally preferable when transaction costs are high.104  Again, 
the law conforms to this prediction, as was shown in the Calabresi-Melamed article.  
Negligence and nuisance rules typically apply to areas in which the cost of transacting is 
high. 
 Consider negligence first.  Negligence typically applies to accidents that occur in 
settings where the injurer cannot bargain with the victim in advance over a potential 
waiver to a claim of liability.  If the potential offender owes a duty of care to the 
victim,105 he will be required to compensate the victim after the injury by an amount that 
will be determined by a court.  Negligence law, in contrast to a property rule such as 
trespass, does not empower the victim to enjoin a potential breach of the duty of care. 
 Unlike the typical negligence case, nuisance cases typically arise between 
adjacent landholders, a setting in which transaction costs appear to be low.  However, as 
Merrill noted, one special feature of nuisance that takes it out of the low transaction cost 
category is that it is often difficult to define the property right that is being protected by 
nuisance law.106  For example, it is difficult to define the right to clean air, or the right to 
a quiet evening.  Further, given that nuisances sometimes injure several parties at the 
                                                 
104 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1,  at 1106; Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 8, at 727. 
105 One point sometimes ignored in the property versus liability rule literature is that liability rules typically 
have allocation or channeling rules that determine the party the liability rule is designed to protect, or 
sometimes disable the liability rule.  Of course, Calabresi and Melamed recognized this issue in their 
famous Rule Four discussion, supra note 1, at 1116-1122.  But their Rule Four discussion ignores the 
disabling feature.  In tort law, duty rules allocate liability rule protection and sometimes disable the liability 
rule.  In the trespass setting, the rule denying a duty to a trespasser is an allocation rule.  The allocation rule 
serves to shield the property owner from expropriation by the trespasser through the trespasser’s assertion 
of a liability rule.  
106 Merrill, supra note 7, at 23. 
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same time, the hold-out incentives identified by Calabresi and Melamed are often 
present.107 
 In general nuisance settings involve instances of intermediate transaction costs, 
in the sense that the cost of meeting to bargain is low, but the cost of reaching an 
agreement is high.   Because the cost of meeting to bargain is low, nuisance law permits 
plaintiffs to enjoin defendants under certain conditions, which is one of the types of 
protection provided by property rules.  However, because the cost of actual bargaining to 
agreement is high, nuisance law operates generally as a liability rule.   The reason I say 
that nuisance law operates as a liability rule is simple: unlike trespass law, there is no 
background norm in the nuisance setting that the invader must first get the consent of the 
victim.  The nuisance generator can conduct his activity, and may be forced to 
compensate the victim if the activity is later deemed by a court to be a nuisance.  The 
right to enjoin typically arises in even more limited settings involving nuisances, and 
even then only in relatively harmful cases.108 
 In sum, tort doctrine conforms to the transaction-cost based division between 
property rules and liability rules originally set out by Calabresi and Melamed and 
expanded in this paper.  One remaining piece of the theory that needs to be applied is the 
statement that property rules are equivalent to liability rules when transaction costs are 
high and the subjective valuations of invaders are less than those of victims. 
                                                 
107 Suppose, for example, smoke damages each of 10 homes located near a factory.  This is similar to the 
eminent domain example discussed in Calabresi and Melamed, supra, 1106-1108.  See also, A. Mitchell 
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 13-16 (New York, NY: Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2003) 
(examining Coase Theorem in a large numbers setting). 
108 See Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts, 602-605; Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 
(N.Y. 1970).  For a theoretical account of the injunction versus damages determination, see Keith N. 
Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 977 (1996). 
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 What is an example in tort law of a setting in which transaction costs are high 
and invader subjective valuations are generally less than those of victims?  The standard 
case of recklessness falls in this category.  Consider, for example, a teenager on a joy ride 
speeding through an area crowded with pedestrians.  The gain to the teen from his 
activity is relatively trivial, at least from the eyes of any outsider who attempts to 
evaluate it.  However, the loss to victims whose lives are put at risk is extremely high.  
Or, take the case, of an individual who plays with a loaded gun on a subway car.  These 
are cases in which invader subjective valuations are less than those of victims.109 
 I realize that this argument involves an interpersonal comparison of utility.  In 
economics, that is generally understood to be a fruitless exercise.  There is no accepted 
cardinal measure of utility that would allow us to make interpersonal comparisons. 110  
However, in law, such comparisons are necessary.  The law cannot take a position of 
agnosticism on the relative values at stake when a person speeds through a crowd of 
pedestrians or plays with a loaded gun on a crowded subway car.  The law has to make 
broad statistical judgments on relative valuations in such settings. 
 Thus, under this paper’s framework, property rules should be applied in cases of 
recklessness, and this is what is observed.  The law treats reckless conduct as equivalent 
                                                 
109 Calabresi and Melamed offer an alternative example.  “If Taney sets a spring gun with the purpose of 
killing or maiming anyone who trespasses on his property, Taney has knowledge of what he is doing and of 
the risks involved which is more akin to the criminal than the negligent driver.  But because Taney does not 
know precisely which of many Marshalls will be the victim of his actions, ex ante negotiations seem 
difficult.  How then do we justify the use of criminal sanctions and of more than compensatory damages?  
Probably the answer lies in the fact that we assume that the benefits of Taney’s act are not worth the harm 
they entail if that harm were fully valued.”  Calabresi and Melamed, at 1126 n.71. 
110 See, e.g., Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 570-71 (Cambridge Univ. Press, Fifth ed. 1997).  
In contrast, Bentham showed impatience toward the argument that interpersonal comparisons could not be 
made.  For example, in discussing the connection between wealth and happiness, Bentham said that “of two 
individuals, he who is richer is the happier or has the greatest chance of being so.”  Bentham Security and  
Equality, supra note 4, at 47.  His explanation was straightforward.  “This is a fact proved by the experience 
of the all the world.  The first who doubts it shall be the very witness I will call to prove it.  Let him give all 
his superfluous wealth to first comer who asks him for it; for this superfluity, according to his system, is but 
dust in his hands; it is a burden and nothing more.”  Id. 
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to intentional conduct governed by trespass doctrine – in the sense that it denies 
contributory negligence defenses, dispenses with any inquiry into fault, and occasionally 
allows for punitive damages.  The law does not aim simply to require compensation, but 
to prohibit the conduct altogether. 
 
B. Criminal Law 
 
 For criminal law, there are two propositions from this framework that are most 
useful for a positive theory.  First, the property rule protecting the victim is preferable to 
the liability rule when transaction costs are low.   Second, when takers’ subjective 
valuations are all below those of victims,111 the property rule is equivalent to the liability 
rule, and superior when it is necessary to disseminate a clear prohibitory message to 
potential takers. 
 These propositions suggest two general goals for criminal law.  One, recognized 
by Posner, is to prevent “market bypassing”.112  In other words, one goal of criminal law 
is to prevent takers from taking things in settings where they could just as easily bargain 
and find a price that meets the subjective valuation of the potential victim.  For example, 
criminal law prohibits theft because it attempts to force potential thieves to use the 
market rather than simply take what they want.  As Posner has demonstrated, the market-
                                                 
111 To be more precise, when the domain or support of the probability distribution of taker valuations lies 
entirely below (or to the left) of the support for the distribution of victim valuations, the property rule is 
equivalent to the liability rule. 
112 Posner, supra note 7, at 1195. 
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bypassing theory provides a rich positive theory of criminal law.113   Posner’s theory can 
be viewed as an implication of the Calabresi-Melamed framework.114 
 The other goal for criminal law suggested by this paper’s analysis is to prohibit 
takings when the subjective valuations of takers are all below those of victims.  The 
importance of this second goal becomes clear once we compare it to Posner’s market-
bypassing theory (the first goal).  The market-bypassing theory, although quite powerful, 
does not explain substantial parts of criminal law.115 
 One part of criminal law unexplained by the market-bypassing theory is the law 
of reckless endangerment.116  For example, consider the case of speeding in the wrong 
direction along a road during a time when traffic is heavy.  Reckless conduct is generally 
not explained as a type of market bypassing.  Unless we consider general safety as an 
                                                 
113 Id., 1214-1230. 
114 Indeed, Calabresi and Melamed discussed the implications of their framework for criminal law in their 
original article, supra note 1, at 1124-1127.  Their discussion clearly anticipates Posner’s market-bypassing 
theory. 
115 To be fair, Posner apparently realizes this, because he switches to Hand formula (or “BPL”) reasoning in 
several parts of his article.  See Posner, supra note 7, at 1221 (explaining intent doctrine) and 1226 
(recklessness).  Yet Posner contends that the prevention of market bypassing is the major function of 
criminal law, id. at 1195.  His arguments and illustrations, however, are more consistent with the 
framework set out in this paper.  Criminal law has the dual goals of preventing market bypassing and 
takings where the subjective valuations of takers are below those of victims.  Both goals are equally 
important in any consistent utilitarian framework. 
116 See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 140 (Lexis Publishing, 3d ed. 2001), citing Model 
Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b)(i) (The Code provides that a person acts “recklessly” if he “consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustified risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” A risk is 
“substantial and unjustifiable” if “considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”)  State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 777 
(Tenn. 2004) (defendant guilty of reckless endangerment after he left a gun in the woods which was later 
found and used by two children who believed it to be a toy, leading to the death of one child and injury of 
the other); State v. Brooks, 658 A.2d 22, 25-26 (Vt. 1995) (Defendant was aware of heating system leak 
that allowed carbon monoxide to enter his house and had been warned that his lack of action was akin to 
playing Russian roulette. Defendant chose not to fix the problem and did not disclose the problem to the 
subsequent buyers of the house. Defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment after the buyers and 
their child died as a result of the carbon monoxide leak.); U.S. v. Williams, 254 F.3d 44 (C.A.2, 2001) 
(defendant guilty of reckless endangerment after he sped and drove the wrong way on a one way street in 
the course of being pursued by police). 
 54
entitlement, the reckless actor does not attempt to take something from the victim that he 
could have easily acquired through bargaining. 
 Reckless conduct is best described as a case where the cost of forbearance or care 
for all potential injurers engaging in the conduct is less than the harm suffered by every 
victim.  In terms of the property versus liability rule propositions set out earlier in this 
paper, reckless conduct cases are those in which the subjective valuations of injurers (in 
this setting, avoidance costs) are all substantially below the harm imposed on victims.  
Given this, there is no social gain generated by reckless conduct.  The law should aim to 
completely deter it, and this is what we observe. 
 Another part of criminal law that is not explained by the market bypassing theory 
is the felony-murder rule. Under the rule, an offender will be convicted of murder when 
he accidentally kills a victim during the course of a felony, such as a robbery.117  For 
example, suppose an offender is holding someone up with a handgun.  The offender hears 
a sudden noise, is startled, and shoots, killing the victim.  Although the offender may not 
have set out with the aim to kill his robbery victim, he will be convicted under the felony-
murder rule.118 
 Felony-murder cases are not easily explained by the market bypassing theory.  In 
one sense, they can be explained market-bypassing theory because the murder often 
                                                 
117 See Dressler, supra note 114 (“At common law, a person is guilty of murder if she kills another person 
during the commission or attempted commission of a felony … The felony-murder rule authorizes strict 
liability for a death that results from the commission of a felony”); State v. Dixon, 122 P.3d 883 (Kan. 
2005) (felony-murder conviction after apartment exploded as a result of defendant turning over stove in the 
course of a robbery, causing gas to escape); People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. App. 1969)(fear and 
alarm caused by armed robbery induces heart attack in victim).  
118 Dressler, supra note 114, at 515 (“The felony-murder rule applies whether a felon kills the victim 
intentionally, recklessly, negligently, or accidentally and unforeseeably.”).  See also, People v. Davis, 213 
Ill. 2d 459, 489 (2004) (“In the stereotypical felony-murder case, an armed robber enters a store and 
demands money. The clerk hesitates, or resists, or perhaps merely makes a sudden movement that startles 
the robber, who fires his weapon, killing the clerk.  It is immaterial whether the robber pulls the trigger 
intending to kill the clerk, or knowing that the clerk’s death is substantially likely to result, or wanting only 
to impress the clerk with the seriousness of his demand, or entirely by accident.”). 
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occurs in connection to some market-bypassing felony, such as armed robbery.  The 
problem with this theory is that the murder itself is not immediately motivated by the 
same interest that led to the robbery.  The robbery is an instance of market bypassing. 
The murder is often the result of a simple accident – as in the case of an armed robber 
who trips in a way that causes his gun to go off. 
 The felony-murder rule is better understood as addressing an injury that occurs in 
an instance in which the underlying activity is socially harmful.119  The core of reckless 
endangerment, generally, involves the decision to engage in an activity that imposes great 
risks on others for a gain that is trivial in comparison, or a gain that can be realized in a 
far less harmful way.  The felony-murder case fits most easily into this category.  The 
legal treatment of felony murder should be viewed as a special case of the treatment of 
reckless conduct generally.120 
 As a third illustration of this paper’s implications for criminal law, consider the 
necessity defense.121  The necessity defense reflects a combination of both the market-
bypassing and subjective valuation propositions.  In other words, the necessity defense 
cannot be understood as an immediate implication of the market bypassing theory alone.  
                                                 
119 Again, Posner’s analysis anticipates this point without quite elevating it to its proper status in an 
economic analysis of criminal law.  Posner, supra note 7, at 1222 (“The male can avoid liability for 
statutory rape by keeping away from young girls, and the robber can avoid liability for felony murder by 
not robbing, or by not carrying a weapon.  In effect we introduce a degree of strict liability into criminal 
law as into tort law when a change in activity level is an efficient method of avoiding a social cost.”) 
120 To continue the comparison with Posner, this is not in my view a case of eliminating the issue of intent 
because we have decided to impose strict liability, as Posner suggests, supra note 7, at 1222.  This is a case 
of inferring criminal intent because the injurer’s conduct evinces a disregard or indifference to the welfare 
of his potential victims.  And this is true generally of reckless conduct.   
121 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1381 (Mass. 1990)(“Under the common law 
defense of justification by necessity, a crime committed under the pressure of imminent danger may be 
excused if the harm sought to be avoided far exceeds the harm resulting from the crime committed”); 
United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 1996) (convicted felon allowed to possess gun in violation of 
his terms of release because of imminent threat to his life); People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. 
1977)(necessity defense in the case of a prison escape by an inmate who was being abused by fellow 
inmates); State v. Baker, 579 A.2d 479 (Vt. 1990) (necessity defense in case of driving with suspended 
license in order to bring take a loved one to the hospital in an emergency). 
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The defense arises in settings where transaction costs are high and the taker’s subjective 
valuation is greater than that of the victim.  Consider, for example, the case of the 
starving man who breaks into a cottage to steal some food.  In this case the cost of 
transacting is high (since the owners are not home) and the subjective value of the taker 
(preserving his life) is greater than that of the victim (preventing a broken window).  In 
the case in which the cost of transacting is high and the taker’s subjective valuation is 
relatively small (the taker, well fed, sees a chocolate cake in the cottage that he wants to 
devour), the necessity defense does not apply. 
 
C. Theory of Damages 
 
 Property rules and liability rules correspond to policies.  The property rule 
protecting the victim reflects a policy prohibiting the taker from taking an act that injures 
the victim.  The liability rule, on the other hand, reflects a policy of internalization.  The 
rule forces takers to pay an objectively assessed determination of the loss suffered by the 
victim.  In this sense, the victim’s loss, or at least the objective part of it, is internalized or 
shifted to the taker. 
 These policies can be applied to the determination of damages.122  Indeed, these 
policies should be applied to the determination of damages because society will not 
always be able to prohibit harmful conduct under the property rule.  In some cases, the 
conduct will occur, and society will have to set up a system of penalties, to be applied 
                                                 
122 From a roughly similar framework applied more extensively, see David D. Haddock, Fred S. 
McChesney, and Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 
78 Cal L. Rev. 1 (1990).  For a wide ranging discussion of the policies behind property rules and liability 
rules and their implications for remedies, see Hanoch Dagan, Unjust Enrichment: A Study of Private Law 
and Public Values 14-22 (Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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after the injury, that will have the effect of prohibiting the undesirable conduct in the 
future.  Since society will often have to permit victims themselves to be the ones to 
enforce the policies underlying the law, damage judgments corresponding to property 
rules should be designed to serve the goals of the property rule. 
 The goals of property rule protection are twofold: to completely deter or prohibit 
nonconsensual invasions and to protect subjective in addition to objective components of 
value.  This implies, first, that the damage level corresponding to the property rule 
protecting the victim should be no less than the minimum amount necessary to deter the 
taker or injurer from engaging in the harmful conduct.  Any amount less than the 
“complete deterrence” level of damages would effectively permit invasions to occur, 
contradicting the prohibitory goal of property rule protection.  Second, the goals of 
property rule protection imply that the damage level corresponding to the property rule 
protecting the victim should be no less than the amount necessary to compensate the 
victim’s total loss, including subjective components.  Any amount less than this would 
fail to protect subjective valuations. 
 Given that complete deterrence should be the goal of damages under a property 
rule, it is straightforward to see what the minimum amount must be.  The damage award 
must be at least as great as the subjective valuation of the taker.  To return to the bicycle 
example of the start of this paper, suppose the taker’s subjective valuation is $100 and the 
victim’s subjective valuation is $85.  To ensure that the policy of the property rule is put 
into effect, the damage amount that is assessed against the taker must be no less than 
$100.  Any damage assessment less than $100 allows the taker to gain from a taking, and 
therefore fails to completely deter or prohibit the taking. 
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 There is a second level below which the damage level under a property rule 
should not be set.  Since property rule protection safeguards subjective valuations of 
entitlements, the damage level should in theory compensate for any expropriation of the 
subjective component of valuation.  Return to the bicycle example.  Suppose the taker’s 
subjective valuation of a bicycle is $25 and the victim’s subjective valuation of his 
bicycle is $85.  The prohibitory policy of property rule protection is satisfied by any 
damage award greater than $25.  But if a taking occurs, and the damage award is set at 
the objective level of $75, the victim will lose $10, contradicting the protective goal of 
property rule protection. 
 It follows that property rule protection implies that the damage level under the 
property rule regime should be no less than the larger of (1) the taker’s subjective 
valuation and (2) the victim’s total loss, including the subjective component.  To return to 
the bicycle example, this implies that if the taker’s valuation is $25 and the victim’s 
valuation is $85, the correct damage level under property rule protection is $85.  On the 
other hand, if the taker’s valuation is $100 and the victim’s valuation is $85, the correct 
damage level is $100.  Of course, this argument assumes these amounts are observable 
and measurable by the court.  In the simple case in which the taker’s subjective valuation 
is captured by the monetary profit he gains from a taking, that assumption is often 
satisfied. 
 At the risk of repetition, this rather simple and abstract argument can be applied 
easily to the determination of damages in tort cases.  The theory suggests that in cases of 
intentional invasions that occur in low-transaction cost settings, damages should be set so 
that they are no less than the larger of the taker’s gain or the victim’s total loss.  This 
 59
approach has a noticeable effect on the determination of damages when the taker’s 
valuation exceeds that of the victim.  In this case, the total damage award should exceed 
the victim’s loss.  However, when the taker’s valuation is less than that of the victim’s a 
court is compelled by this theory to do its best to compensate both objective and 
subjective components of valuation. 
 Does the law correspond to this prediction?  In a rough sense, the answer is yes.  
The law of conversion distinguishes between innocent and knowing actors.123  The 
knowing converter acts in a low transaction cost setting, because his knowledge implies 
that he could have easily bargained with the owner before taking the property.  The 
innocent converter, in comparison, acts in a high transaction cost setting.  In the case of 
the innocent converter who digs gold from the victim’s property or cuts down trees, the 
damage remedy is the value of the property taken less the value of the defendant’s 
labor.124  In the case of the willful converter, the damage remedy is the value of the 
property taken with no reduction to reflect the value of converter’s labor.125  In other 
words, in the case of the intentional converter courts impose a gain-stripping judgment 
that exceeds the victim’s loss.126 
 The law of punitive damages permits courts to levy such damages when the 
defendant has acted with intent or malice.  Certainly the intentional taking of property – 
e.g., stealing a bicycle – serves as an example of an act done with an intent to harm.  In 
many jurisdictions, courts have permitted juries to consider the gains or profits received 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts  572-73 (Aspen Publishers, 8th ed.  2004) 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 The election to sue for restitution permits the plaintiff to make the determination whether he gains more 
by suing for damages or for unjust enrichment.  See William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 628 
(1971); Arthur Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 Yale L. J. 221 (1910). 
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by defendants in the assessment of punitive damages,127 though that law is now open to 
question as a result of State Farm v. Campbell.128  Moreover, punitive damage cases have 
often referred to subjective (or non-measurable) components of loss as a justification for 
a punitive award.129  In effect, punitive damages law has evolved to further the policies 
embedded in property rules.  By allowing and indeed encouraging courts to add a 
surcharge to damages when the taker has acted with intent to harm, the law of punitive 
damages works to prevent property rules from being converted into liability rules. 
 Continuing with the general theory, the other case in which the property rule 
policy may be applied is where the subjective valuations of takers generally are less than 
those of victims.  I suggested the case of reckless conduct as the prime example earlier in 
this paper.  Here, too, punitive damages law permits courts to add a surcharge to the 
damage award when the injurer (or taker) has acted in a way that shows an indifference to 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d 154, 165 (1997) (“punitive damages must be in 
excess of the profit created by the misconduct so that the defendant recognizes a loss”); Green Oil Co. v. 
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-224 (Ala. 1989)(seven factor test for punitive awards including profits from 
injury as factor); Bowyer v. Hi-Lad, Inc., 609 S.E. 2d 895, 900 (W. Va. 2004)(“if the defendant profited 
from his wrongful conduct the punitive damages should remove the profit and should be in excess of the 
profit, so that the award discourages future bad acts by defendant”); Marie Deonier & Associates v. Paul 
Revere Life Ins. Co., 101 P. 3d 742, 749 (list of factors including “the profitability of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing”).  The Supreme Court has supported the use of profits in determining the measure of punitive 
damages.  See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991)(approving of the seven 
factors used by Alabama courts to determine punitive awards, two of which were based on profits); Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 442 (2001)(noting that profits gained as a 
result of defendant’s wrongdoing could be used to determine punitive damages in order to deter future 
conduct).   
128 538 U.S. 408, 409-410 (2002) (arguing that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause requires a close 
connection between the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive award).  For a discussion of the 
consideration of illicit profits in the determination of punitive damages, see Brief of Keith N. Hylton as 
Amicus Curiae in Johnson v. Ford, No.B121917, available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/amicus. 
129 See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 553 (1872)(“It is customary to instruct juries that they may 
give vindictive damages where there are circumstances of malice, willfulness, wantonness, outrage and 
indignity attending the wrong complained of”); TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Records, 279 F. Supp. 2d 
413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(describing injuries worthy of punitive damages as those that “weigh 
substantially more in relation to the damages assayed in unquantifiable terms, for example, effects on the 
victim’s human dignity, social equality or moral worth or on general public health, safety, or order”); 
Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F. 3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting, as one of several justifications for punitive 
damages, that compensatory damage awards “are likely to fall short in some cases, especially when the 
injury is of an elusive or intangible character”). 
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the welfare of his victims.  Consider, for example, someone who fires a gun into a crowd, 
causing only minor damage.  Most courts would have little trouble finding such conduct 
to be reprehensible and deserving of a punitive judgment.  Again, punitive damages law 
works in this case to preserve the policy behind the underlying property rule. 
 Under the theory of this paper, the purpose of a punitive damage award is to 
ensure that the policy of the property rule is put into effect – or, to prevent the property 
rule from being converted into a liability rule.  The punitive damage award appears in this 
theory not to be puzzling wrinkle in the common law.  Punitive awards serve the 
important function of making sure that property rules mean what they say. 
 There is an alternative theory of punitive damages that holds that they should be 
designed to compensate for uncertainty in punishment.130  According to this theory, if 
defendants typically avoid liability in fifty percent of their injuries, damages awards 
against them should be doubled in order to make sure that defendants pay for the full loss 
they impose on society.  This theory is by no means inconsistent with that of this paper.  
However, it should be understood as a theory of liability rules only.  Multiplying damage 
awards in order to compensate for uncertainty simply ensures that losses, objectively 
measured, are shifted to injurers. 
 As a general matter, before any attempt is made to multiply damages, a court 
should first determine whether property rule or liability rule protection is appropriate.  If 
liability rule protection is appropriate, it may be desirable to multiply damages to 
compensate for uncertainty in punishment, though this is often unnecessary and in 
                                                 
130 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
869 (1998). 
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general depends on many factors.131  If property rule protection is appropriate, the court 
should first determine that the award is large enough to fully compensate the victim for 
both objective and subjective losses, and to wipe out any gains enjoyed by the injurer.  In 
cases where punishment is uncertain, it may be necessary to multiply the gain-eliminating 
quantity in order to provide the appropriate level of deterrence. 
 The theory offered here also has implications for “pain and suffering” awards.  
Awards for pain and suffering typically reflect the effort of a court to estimate the 
subjective component of loss.  Indeed, many plaintiff attorneys attempt to persuade jurors 
and judges to provide such damages by asking them to consider what a typical person 
would demand to be left in the condition of the victim.132  Once we recognize that pain 
and suffering awards reflect judicial efforts to estimate the subjective component of loss, 
their role in a system of damages becomes clear under the theory of this paper. 
 The general role or function of pain and suffering damages is as follows.   Under 
the conditions in which the property rule is socially preferable to the liability rule, they 
are unquestionably permissible.  They function in a way that is similar to punitive 
                                                 
131 Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and its Alternatives, 97 Michigan 
Law Review 2185 (1999). 
132 See, e.g., Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co. 267 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1959) (plaintiff’s attorney asked jury 
“What is the eye worth and what could you get anybody to give it to you for?” and to “give us the kind of 
deal that you would want to get”); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F.2d 439, 442 (C.A. 5 1934) 
(counsel asked jury “take it yourselves, would you swallow that glass and put yourself in that girl’s position 
for a few paltry thousand dollars?”); A.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Bellingham School Dist., 105 P.3d 400, 407 
(Wash. 2004) (“And think about really what it boils down to is what's the value of a dollar. What do you 
have to go through to get your dollars? What do they mean to you when you have them? Think about  
what it means to you.”); Czerski v. Yellow Cab Co-op, Inc. 2004 WL 2475559 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2004) 
(asking the jury “what would we have to pay to you Mr. Reasonable Person, for you to walk around with a 
broken tibial fracture? What would that cost?”); Rodriguez v. Slattery, 194 N.W. 2d 817, 819 (Wis. 1972) 
(“If it was your 7 year old, I don’t think you would go for that [award].”).  In these examples, the appellate 
courts criticized the plaintiff’s argument because it encouraged the jury to depart from neutrality.  
However, the attempt to get the jury to look at pain and suffering as compensation for subjective losses is 
probably the standard practice of trial lawyers.   
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damages.  By forcing the taker to pay for the subjective component of the victim’s total 
loss, they prevent property rules from being converted into liability rules. 
 Under the conditions in which a liability rule is preferable to a property rule, pain 
and suffering awards appear to be difficult to defend.  Pain and suffering awards attempt 
to mimic the subjective valuation protection provided by property rules, though under a 
liability rule regime.  However, liability rules, unlike property rules, are not designed to 
protect subjective valuations.  Liability rules reflect a social decision to permit some risk-
generating activities to occur even though they might result in an uncompensated loss to 
the victim in certain cases.  The reason is that the social gain from these activities 
exceeds the social cost. 
 Under the paper’s model, the desirability of pain and suffering awards under a 
liability rule regime is unclear.  On one hand, liability rules assume by their structure a 
level of risk bearing on the part of the victim that is not consistent with compensating 
subjective components of loss.  On the other hand, the undercompensation problem is 
probably most severe in the case of suffering caused by physical injury.  This suggests 
that the only case that can be made for pain and suffering awards under a liability rule 
regime is one based on empirical evidence demonstrating socially desirable incentive 
effects.133 
                                                 
133 If objective damages are generally correct on average because the subjective component of loss averages 
out to zero, adding a positive “pain and suffering” option pushes the average damage award above the 
average total loss.  This leads to overdeterrence, and implies that social welfare under the liability rule 
without pain-and-suffering awards exceeds social welfare under the liability rule with pain-and-suffering 
awards.  In the case of physical injury, the assumption that the subjective component averages to zero is 
probably incorrect; the average is probably positive.  However, the problem in the case of physical injury is 
that the pain-and-suffering award’s size and unpredictability might still result in overdeterrence.  In 
addition, the pain-and-suffering option introduces a highly unpredictable component of damages, which 
increases the cost of litigation. The cost of litigation increases because the uncertainty associated with pain 
and suffering awards makes settlement of litigation less likely.  On settlement incentives generally, see 
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the 
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D. Property Law: Eminent Domain 
 
In Kelo v. New London,134 the United States Supreme Court held that the “public 
use” requirement of the Constitution’s takings clause was satisfied in a case in which the 
condemned land was to be transferred to a private developer to construct a commercial 
complex including stores and business facilities.   This paper’s framework sheds light on 
the function and desirability of the public use requirement. 
 Calabresi and Melamed described eminent domain as a potentially efficient 
liability rule because it prevents hold-outs from blocking development projects.135  
However, Calabresi and Melamed also suggested that the eminent domain rule’s 
efficiency depends on a comparison of costs and benefits.136  If property is transferred 
with a compensatory award given to its previous owners, their subjective valuations may 
be expropriated.  Enforcing a property rule, however, runs the risk that the development 
will be blocked.  The liability rule is preferable to the property rule when the losses from 
blocking efficient developments exceed the costs of expropriation. 
 The Calabresi-Melamed discussion, though valid as a general matter, presents a 
somewhat ahistorical picture of the eminent domain problem by emphasizing the rule’s 
function as a solution to the hold-out problem.  Probably the most important function of 
the compensation rule is to dampen incentives for expropriation.  If a government knows 
                                                                                                                                                 
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982).  On the predictability problem and pain and 
suffering awards, see Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the 
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for a Change, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. __ (2005); Bovbjerg, 
Sloan and Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling pain-and-suffering, 83 Nw U. L. Rev. 908 
(1989). 
134 545 U.S. __ (2005). 
135 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 1, at 1106-1108. 
136 Id. 
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that it must compensate property owners when it takes their property, it is less likely to 
do so for bad motives.  And if the government knows that is must compensate, then those 
who lobby the government in order to bring about the transfer know that their chances of 
success are inversely related to the level of compensation required. 
 Compensation plays an important role in dampening rent-seeking incentives, but 
it may not be sufficient.  If a private developer can make a profit by having land 
transferred to it at a price set by the state – a call option on the land – the developer may 
have a strong incentive to lobby for the government to condemn property and transfer it 
even with compensation required.  This is especially true if the market value of the land 
targeted for transfer is low.  The lobbying process and its distorting effects on 
government are part of the denormalization costs identified earlier in this paper. 
 This suggests a function for the public use requirement in the Takings Clause.  
Since the compensation requirement is not sufficient to deter rent-seeking by private 
parties, the public use requirement is likely to be a useful additional barrier; especially in 
the case in which, because of the land’s low market value, the compensation requirement 
is a weak deterrent against land grabs.  If the social costs of rent-seeking are high relative 
to those connected to bargaining failure, then the public use requirement will enhance 
social welfare.  As I noted earlier, this is an empirical question, but the inclusion of the 
public use requirement in the constitution’s text presumably indicates a perception on the 
part of its framers that the requirement served a useful function in light of the historical 
evidence. 
 
E. Conditional Property Rules and Incomplete Information 
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 Michael Wachter and George Cohen have extended the property and liability rule 
paradigm by including a “bargaining rule”.137  The bargaining rule is observed, as far as I 
can tell, in only one area of the law: labor law.  The bargaining rule works as follows.  
The holder of an entitlement is protected from taking, just as in a property rule regime.  
However, the holder cannot make use of his entitlement unless he satisfies an obligation 
to bargain in good faith with the other party.  The bargaining rule, in effect, sets up a 
conditional entitlement.  The entitlement is incomplete until the holder satisfies certain 
conditions. 
 To see how a conditional entitlement scheme might enhance efficiency, return to 
the example discussed earlier of bargaining under incomplete information (Part IV).  The 
victim (entitlement holder) places a value of $75 on the bicycle.  There are two types of 
high-valuing takers, with valuations of $100 and $80, and one type of low-valuing taker 
with a valuation of 25.  The efficient outcome is one in which high-valuing takers acquire 
bicycles and low-valuing takers do not.  Under a property rule, all exchanges must take 
place through voluntary bargains.  Because of incomplete information, the victim does 
not know whether the taker’s valuation is $100 or $80 (he knows it is not $25, because no 
low-valuing taker would approach him for a trade).  Recall that under the property rule, 
some efficient exchanges might not take place because the victim might make a demand 
of $99, hoping that the surplus gained from trades with the $100-value takers would more 
than offset the forgone trades with the $80-value takers. 
 Now suppose we introduce the bargaining rule.  Under the bargaining rule, all 
exchanges must take place through voluntary trades.  However, the victim (holder of 
                                                 
137 Wachter and Cohen, supra note 7. 
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entitlement) must bargain in good faith in order to gain full use of his property.  How 
does this work?  Suppose the victim, with a modest expenditure can determine whether 
he faces a $100-value taker or an $80-value taker.  He decides not to invest in identifying 
the taker’s type because he profits more by the strategy of making high demands and 
forgoing trades with the $80-value takers.  If the victim makes a demand of $99 to a taker 
whose valuation is $80, the bargaining rule denies the victim full use of his entitlement 
until he satisfies good faith obligations (e.g., to identify the taker type).138  If the 
entitlement’s value to the victim drops sufficiently far (because the victim is denied full 
use of it), the victim will have an incentive to identify the taker type first.  Moreover, the 
outcome in which the victim satisfies good faith obligations may be socially desirable to 
that in which he acts strategically. 
 To be more specific, the victim has a choice in this example to make a demand of 
$99 or $79.  If he makes a demand of $79 it will always be accepted, giving him a gain of 
$4.  If he makes a demand of $99, it will be accepted only by the $100-value takers.  If 
the percentage of $100-value takers exceeds 16.7 percent, he will prefer to make the $99 
demand.139  Again, the reason for this is that the victim gains more by getting a $24 
surplus in trades with $100-value takers while forgoing trades with the $80 takers. 
 Now suppose the victim can find out the taker’s type by spending $2.  Suppose 
the percentage of $100-value takers is .55.   Then the victim will not invest the $2 to 
identify the taker’s type, because he is still better off getting the $99 payment from $100-
                                                 
138 Labor law often imposes, as part of the good faith requirement, a duty to meet with the other bargaining 
party.  This could be seen as a requirement that each bargaining party spend some resources to identify the 
other party’s “type”.  Meeting face-to-face allows each party to observe facial expressions and other signals 
of the seriousness with which the other party views its own bargaining positions. 
139  Let the proportion of $100-value takers among the high-valuing takers be p.  The strategy of demanding 
$99 is preferable to the victim if p($24) > p(4) + (1-p)($4), which is true when p > .167. 
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value takers and forgoing trades with the $80-value takers.140  However, this is an 
inefficient result.  The joint wealth of takers and victims would be greater if the victim 
invested the $2 to learn the taker’s type before making a price demand.  The reason the 
victim’s choice diverges from what is best for society is that the victim focuses only on 
that portion of the surplus that goes to him, giving no weight at all to the portion of the 
surplus that goes to the taker.141 
 A bargaining rule could change the incentives for the better.  A bargaining rule 
reduces the value of the entitlement to the victim when the victim fails to bargain in good 
faith (in this case, fails to invest in identifying the taker’s type and the bargain fails).  If 
the value of the entitlement to the victim falls sufficiently far ($0.44 is sufficient in this 
example),142 the victim will prefer to spend the $2 fee to determine the taker’s type rather 
than make a strategic high-price demand. 
 This example illustrates how a bargaining rule could improve efficiency relative 
to a property rule in settings of incomplete information.  It suggests that it is possible to 
modify the property rule regime, as we see in the labor law area, to reduce the efficiency 
costs of strategic behavior.  This result, coupled with the finding that property rules 
protect subjective evaluations, suggests that property rule regimes have an advantage in 
                                                 
140 Note that if the victim makes a $99 demand, his average payoff will be (.55)($24) = $13.2.  If he pays 
the $2 to identify taker types, his average payoff will be (.55)($24) + (.45)($4) - $2 = $13.  He will 
therefore make the $99 demand. In general, in this example, the victim will prefer to make the $99 demand 
if p($24) > p($24) + (1-p)($4) - $2; so if p > .5, the victim will prefer the high demand strategy to investing 
$2 to identify the taker’s type. 
141 The social condition compares the total surplus, not the surplus received only by the victim.  Under a 
total surplus comparison, we should compare the average surplus forfeited (from forgone trades) with the 
cost of the investment $2; that is, compare (1-p)($5) > $2.  Since (1-p)($5) exceeds $2 when p = .55, 
society’s wealth is enhanced if the victim invests to identify the taker’s type. 
142 Under these assumptions, if the victim makes a high-price strategic demand the value of his bicycle falls 
by some amount.  Suppose it falls by $2.  The payoff to making a high demand is then (.55)($24) + (.45)(-
$2) = $12.3.  The payoff to identifying the taker’s type is $13.  In this case, the victim will prefer to pay $2 
to identify the taker’s type rather than make a high-price strategic demand. In general, in this example, a 
reduction in the entitlement’s value (to the victim) of only .44 is sufficient to induce the victim to invest $2 
to identify the taker’s type. 
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certain settings where bargaining occurs.  The bargaining rule has the effect of 
conditionally restricting the entitlement in a way that gives the holder an incentive to 
avoid strategic conduct.143  One can think of this conditional restriction as either creating 
a stick or a carrot.  If one views it as a stick, the restriction of the entitlement creates an 
in-built penalty that falls when the entitlement holder acts in a particular strategic fashion.  
Viewed as a carrot, the division creates an incentive for the entitlement holder to act in 
good faith in order to preserve the value of the entitlement. 
 As I said before, labor law appears to be the only area of the law in which 
bargaining rules are observed.  Labor law is an appropriate area for such a rule to be 
devised, because it is perhaps the only field of law in which courts actually regulate the 
bargaining process.  Labor courts are forced, by the cases that come before them, to 
directly confront issues such as strategic conduct, incomplete information, and the 
sharing of the bargain surplus.   
 The specific bargaining rule that has emerged in labor law prevents the employer 
(the relevant entitlement holder in most cases) from making a unilateral decision with 
respect to some entitlement until he has first reached an impasse after bargaining in good 
faith.144  If the employer has not reached an impasse, or has bargained in bad faith, he is 
                                                 
143 Although the description of a restricted entitlement seems similar to the divided entitlement concept by 
Ayres and Talley, the argument here is quite different from theirs.  As Kaplow and Shavell note, the Ayres 
and Talley paper focuses on the choice between property rules and liability rules.  Kaplow and Shavell, 
supra note 8, at 785-786.  The liability rule, in the Ayres and Talley analysis, is itself a type of entitlement 
division.  Entitlement division in their analysis reduces incentives to act strategically because a seller of 
entitlement realizes that he might become the buyer.  Ayres and Talley, supra note 8, at 1030-31.  In my 
analysis, the conditional bargaining rule is a modified property rule, not a liability rule.  It conditions use of 
the entitlement on satisfaction of certain obligations, but at no point does it threaten to transfer the 
entitlement to the other party. 
144 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); see also, Robert A. Gorman and Matthew W. Finkin, Basic Text 
on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 600-604 (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing, 2d ed. 
2004). 
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forbidden from acting unilaterally.145  Suppose, for example, the employer wants to 
reduce wages by $1 per hour.  The employer must first bargain with the union in good 
faith.  It is a violation of that duty to bargain if the employer simply reduces wages 
without bargaining, or if the employer bargains in bad faith.146  The example discussed in 
this section illustrates how the bargaining rule observed in labor law could enhance 
efficiency.  The bargaining rule, if implemented well, could induce employers to bargain 
in an effort to sincerely meet the legitimate demands of the employees rather than gain a 
strategic advantage. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper has reexamined the economics of property and liability rules, a topic 
introduced in the seminal article by Calabresi and Melamed.  In recent years, a new 
literature has emerged applying a rigorous analysis of bargaining incentives to the topic.  
The new bargaining theory literature has greatly advanced the theoretical analysis of 
property and liability rules.  However, the bargaining theory literature has also suggested 
that the fundamental proposition of the Calabresi-Melamed article, that property rules are 
superior on welfare grounds to liability rules when transaction costs are low, is invalid.  
Using an informal model of bargaining between a taker and a victim, I have shown that 
the fundamental proposition remains valid.  However, the informal model presented here, 
like all models, has pointed a beam of light at one key premise of the theory that had 
apparently been underemphasized or ignored in the recent literature; that property rules 
protect the subjective valuations of entitlement holders while liability rules do not.  The 
                                                 
145 Gorman and Finkin, supra note 144, at 600. 
146 Id. at 601. 
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failure of liability rules to protect subjective valuations gives rise to litigation and costly 
efforts to avoid expropriation (or to engage in expropriation), reducing society’s wealth.  
This is the core reason that the fundamental proposition regarding property rules remains 
valid and the positive legal theory based on the proposition – e.g., Posner’s “market-
bypassing” theory of criminal law doctrine – remains valid as well. 
 
